In Pari Delicto Deconstructed: Dismantling the Doctrine that Protects the Business Entity\u27s Lawyer from Malpractice Liability by Paula Schaefer
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 90 
Number 4 Volume 90, Winter 2016, Number 4 Article 5 
April 2017 
In Pari Delicto Deconstructed: Dismantling the Doctrine that 
Protects the Business Entity's Lawyer from Malpractice Liability 
Paula Schaefer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Paula Schaefer (2016) "In Pari Delicto Deconstructed: Dismantling the Doctrine that Protects the Business 
Entity's Lawyer from Malpractice Liability," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 90 : No. 4 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
1003 
IN PARI DELICTO DECONSTRUCTED: 
DISMANTLING THE DOCTRINE THAT 
PROTECTS THE BUSINESS ENTITY’S 
LAWYER FROM MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 
PAULA SCHAEFER† 
“Fraud on behalf of a corporation is not the same thing as fraud 
against it.”1 
“If a lawyer for an organization knows that an 
[agent] . . . intends to act . . . [in] violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization . . . then the 
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best 
interest of the organization.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
The in pari delicto doctrine provides that a plaintiff who 
participated equally with a defendant in wrongdoing cannot 
pursue a claim against the defendant.3  In pari delicto is a 
shortened version of the phrase in pari delicto potior est conditio 
defendantis, which means “[i]n a case of equal or mutual 
fault . . . the position of the [defending] party . . . is the better 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. Thanks to 
Zachary Arnold and Grant Ward for their research assistance. 
1 Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982). 
2 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2015). 
3 Feld & Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick, & Cabot, 458 A.2d 
545, 548–49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (explaining that the in pari delicto doctrine is an 
application of the principle that “no court will lend its aid to a man who grounds his 
action upon an immoral or illegal act” and noting that the doctrine was first applied 
in a 1760 case by Lord Mansfield). 
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one.”4  Courts often describe dual policies underlying the in pari 
delicto defense: deterrence of illegal conduct and protection of the 
sanctity of the courts.5 
Lawyers invoke in pari delicto when sued for malpractice for 
failing to protect a client from legal liability.6  A common scenario 
involves a lawyer advising a client to lie under oath; the client 
follows the advice and suffers damage as a result.7  When the 
client sues the lawyer for legal malpractice based on the lawyer’s 
negligent advice, the lawyer can have the case dismissed based 
on in pari delicto.8  Courts reason that the client understood that 
it was wrong to lie under oath and that both client and lawyer 
are equally at fault for the client’s resulting damages, justifying 
dismissal on the basis of in pari delicto.9 
4 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) 
(alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979)). 
5 Bank of the United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. 527, 538 (1829) (“[N]o court of 
justice can in its nature be made the handmaid of iniquity.”); Claybrook v. Broad & 
Cassel, P.A. (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 364 B.R. 562, 566 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) 
(describing the equitable doctrine’s purposes of preventing “culpable parties from 
benefitting from their wrongdoings” and ensuring that courts do not mediate 
disputes among wrongdoers). 
6 The claim may be framed as one for legal malpractice—that is, professional 
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or breach of contract. All three claims are often 
asserted by a plaintiff and treated by courts as essentially stating the same cause of 
action. See, e.g., Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 
B.R. 34, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The Trustee’s three causes of action—legal malpractice, 
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty—essentially amount to a single claim 
for the provision of deficient legal services.”); Kirschner v. K&L Gates LLP, 46 A.3d 
737, 748, 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (trustee alleged legal 
malpractice/professional negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty 
based on law firm’s failure to detect and report fraud of company CEO). The term 
“malpractice” as used in this Article is meant to encompass all such claims. 
7 See, e.g., Grosso v. Biaggi, No. 12 Civ. 6118(JMF), 2013 WL 3743482, at *1–3 
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013) (in legal malpractice action, former client alleges that she 
committed perjury in dental malpractice case at direction of lawyer, resulting in a 
much smaller verdict than if she had not lied); Evans v. Cameron, 360 N.W.2d 25, 27 
(Wis. 1985) (client alleges she lied in a bankruptcy proceeding at direction of her 
attorney, resulting in her investigation and possible prosecution for perjury). 
8 Grosso, 2013 WL 3743482, at *3 (ruling that where plaintiff bases her legal 
malpractice claim on her own perjury, plaintiff is in pari delicto with her attorney 
and the malpractice claim is barred as a matter of law); Evans, 360 N.W.2d at 29 
(holding that the client’s “deliberate act of lying under oath” places her in pari 
delicto with counsel, thus barring her claim against him). 
9 Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 447 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989) (“We can readily envision legal matters so complex . . . that a client could 
follow an attorney’s advice, do wrong and still maintain suit on the basis of not being 
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While this example involves a client who is an individual,10 
the in pari delicto defense also can be invoked when the client is 
a business that—through its agents—engaged in fraudulent or 
criminal conduct that ultimately damaged the company.11  In this 
context, the legal malpractice case is filed against a business 
entity’s attorney who failed to advise against the conduct, failed 
to inform other agents within the organization about the 
misconduct so that they could intervene, or participated in the 
misconduct.12  Often, the business has filed for bankruptcy and 
the trustee is bringing the malpractice claim against the 
company’s former lawyers.13  In other cases, suit is filed by the 
company itself, an assignee of the company’s rights, a court-
appointed receiver, or its shareholders as a derivative suit.14 
equally at fault. But perjury is not complex; and telling the truth poses no 
dilemma.”). 
10 See cases cited supra note 7. 
11 See Henry S. Bryans, Claims Against Lawyers by Bankruptcy Trustees—A 
First Course on the In Pari Delicto Defense, 66 BUS. LAW. 587, 587 (2011) (“A cursory 
examination of reported decisions in the last seven years reflects over forty claims 
brought by bankruptcy trustees against debtors’ pre-petition lawyers.”). 
12 See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 946 (N.Y. 2010) (including 
a lawyer allegedly participating in client’s agents’ fraudulent scheme). Similarly, an 
auditor malpractice case may be brought based on an auditor’s failure to detect 
fraud and report it to appropriate company agents so that the company could have 
avoided injury. See, e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (considering liability of independent auditors for failing to detect or report 
fraud by company management). 
13 See, e.g., Claybrook v. Broad & Cassel, P.A. (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 
364 B.R. 562 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (explaining that a chapter 7 trustee of the estates 
of Scott Acquisition Corporation and Scotty’s Inc. filed claims against attorneys for 
legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty); Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 946 
(bringing a suit by litigation trustee charged with pursuing causes of action 
possessed by company prior to its bankruptcy). The plaintiff stands in the shoes of 
the company and not its creditors, making the malpractice claim appropriate but 
also making the plaintiff subject to defenses that could have been asserted against 
the company. Grubin v. Rattet (In re Food Mgmt. Grp., LLC), 380 B.R. 677, 693 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a trustee “may only assert claims held by the 
bankrupt corporation.”). 
14 Though some of the following cases were not legal malpractice claims, all are 
representative of the entities that could file a legal malpractice claim in this context. 
Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, 857 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (court-appointed receiver filed suit on behalf of the company against three sets 
of attorneys and their firms who represented company prior to receivership); 
Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 998 A.2d 280, 280–82 
(Del. 2010) (bringing a derivative suit by the shareholders of AIG, Inc. against 
insiders and the company’s accountants for professional negligence); Chaikovska v. 
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Courts have applied in pari delicto to dismiss these claims 
against the company’s lawyers.  The plaintiffs in these cases 
stand in the shoes of the wrongdoing company and cannot escape 
the company’s misconduct.15  There is indeed “company 
misconduct” because, applying basic agency principles, 
management’s knowledge or misconduct must be imputed to the 
company.16  While there is an exception to imputation when the 
agents acted adverse to the company’s interests, that exception is 
a narrow one inapplicable when agents engaged in misconduct 
for the company’s benefit.17  Courts reason that applying in pari 
delicto in such cases deters illegal conduct18 and allows courts to 
avoid being parties to the misconduct.19 
This Article deconstructs these principles that seemingly 
favor the in pari delicto doctrine barring claims against an 
organization’s lawyer.  In examining in pari delicto in these 
cases, it becomes apparent that the doctrine is inconsistent with 
an attorney’s fiduciary duty to organizational clients.  By barring 
or substantially limiting claims against business lawyers in this 
context, in pari delicto has effectively immunized lawyers from 
liability when they fail to perform one of their most important 
functions: acting competently to protect their organizational 
clients from legal liability.20  This Article explains how two bodies 
of law—in pari delicto and attorney fiduciary duty—should be 
reconciled to better protect the interests of organizational clients 
and to give attorneys incentives to competently represent their 
organizational clients. 
Ernst & Young, LLP, 913 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (filing accounting 
malpractice claim by the majority shareholder and corporation’s assignee). 
15 See infra Section II.A. 
16 See infra Section II.A. 
17 See infra Section II.B. 
18 See infra Section II.E. 
19 See infra Section II.D. 
20 George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for 
Failure To Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of 
Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 656–57 (1998) (“The 
protection of the [organizational] client from the consequences of fraud or illegal 
conduct within the scope of the lawyer’s engagement is or ought to be central to the 
organizational lawyer’s enterprise. When the lawyer is actually aware of such 
danger to the client’s interests it does not seem unfair to hold her responsible for the 
consequences of failing to take reasonable steps to protect the client.”). 
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Following this introduction, Part I discusses a representative 
case in this area.21  The court’s decision highlights the typical 
reasoning for barring a malpractice claim against a lawyer even 
when the lawyer facilitated agent misconduct that severely 
damaged an entity client.  Then, Part II considers each of the 
principles underlying the in pari delicto defense in organizational 
client legal malpractice cases.  Each principle is juxtaposed with 
attorney fiduciary duty law.  Part III considers some variations 
on the in pari delicto doctrine and whether these variations are 
more compatible with an organization’s attorney’s fiduciary duty. 
Having determined that attorney fiduciary duty is at odds 
with in pari delicto in the organizational client context, Part IV 
explores why the doctrines should be aligned and determines how 
best to accomplish that reconciliation.  This Part considers when 
imputation may still be appropriate and discusses the safeguards 
that could prevent organizational clients from shifting all of the 
costs of agent misconduct to outside counsel.  Finally, the Article 
concludes with thoughts about the benefits for businesses and 
the legal profession when lawyers face liability for failing to 
protect their organizational clients from liability. 
I. A REPRESENTATIVE CASE: LAWYER MALPRACTICE IMMUNITY
THROUGH IN PARI DELICTO 
“A criminal who is injured committing a crime cannot sue the 
police officer or security guard who failed to stop him; the 
arsonist who is singed cannot sue the fire department.”22 
Attorney Joseph Collins represented Refco and its related 
companies (referred to collectively as “Refco”) in a number of 
business matters.23  Beginning in 1998, Collins helped Refco 
21 The case is governed by New York law, which is significant because New York 
is noted for its protection of professionals through its strong in pari delicto doctrine. 
See, e.g., Gregory W. Fox, Limits of Expansive Protection of New York’s In Pari 
Delicto Defense, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (2014) (“Simply put, New York’s version 
of the in pari delicto defense is among the most protective to professionals in the 
nation.”). 
22 Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010). 
23 Collins, and other attorneys at his firm Mayer, Brown, Rowe, & Maw, LLP 
(“Mayer Brown”), represented Refco Group Ltd., LLC, its indirect subsidiary Refco 
Capital Markets. Ltd., and a company that was created through an initial public 
offering, Refco, Inc. Kirschner v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07 Civ. 11604(GEL), 2009 
WL 1286326, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2009). All of the Refco entities are referred to 
collectively in the courts’ decisions as “Refco.” KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 945 n.1. 
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executives structure seventeen “round-trip” loan transactions 
that had the sole purpose of temporarily removing hundreds of 
millions of dollars in uncollectable intercompany debt from 
Refco’s books.24  As a result, the company was able to attract 
investors for a 2004 leveraged buyout and for a 2005 initial 
public offering of its stock.25  After the IPO, the hidden 
uncollectable debt was revealed, the stock price fell, and the 
company was forced to file for bankruptcy.26  A “flood of civil 
litigation” followed.27 
Collins and a number of Refco executives were convicted and 
sentenced for the roles they played in the massive fraud.28  As the 
criminal cases proceeded, so did the bankruptcy case.  The 
bankruptcy plan established the Refco Litigation Trust to pursue 
causes of actions possessed by Refco prior to bankruptcy.29  Mark 
Kirschner, as trustee of the Refco Litigation Trust, filed a legal 
malpractice case against Collins’ law firm, Mayer Brown, 
alleging claims of malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding 
and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting 
fraud.30  Kirschner filed related claims of fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and malpractice against Refco insiders, the 
investment banks that served as underwriters for the leveraged 
24 In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 306–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 945–46 n.2. 
25 KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 945. 
26 Id. at 945–46. 
27 Id. at 945 n.2 (citing In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 618 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Grant Thornton LLP, 586 F. 
Supp. 2d 119, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd. Brokerage 
Customer Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 643(GEL), 2007 WL 2694469, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
13, 2007)). 
28 Collins was sentenced to one year and one day for his conviction for 
“conspiracy, securities fraud, [submitting] false filings with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and wire fraud.” United States v. Collins, 581 F. App’x 59, 59 
(2d Cir. 2014). In the criminal case against Collins, the district court gave the jury 
an instruction on “conscious avoidance,” allowing the jury to find the element of 
knowledge by determining that Collins’s participation in the crime was “so 
overwhelmingly suspicious that the defendant’s failure to question the suspicious 
circumstances establishes the defendant’s purposeful contrivance to avoid guilty 
knowledge.” Id. at 60 (emphasis omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding there was sufficient evidence to 
support the conscious avoidance charge. Id. at 61. 
29 KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 946. 
30 Complaint at 107–12, Kirschner v. Grant Thornton LLP, (No. 07-cv-05306) 
(Cook Cnty Ct. filed Sept. 19, 2007). 
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buyout and the initial public offering, third parties that 
participated in the loans, and accounting firms employed by 
Refco.31  The cases, which were originally filed in Illinois and 
Massachusetts state court, were removed to federal court and 
transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York.32 
The law firm, accounting firms, investment banks, and third 
party participants in the loans filed motions to dismiss, asserting 
that the litigation trustee lacked standing to bring the claims 
under the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 
Wagoner doctrine.33  The Wagoner doctrine provides that a 
bankruptcy trustee lacks standing to recover from third parties 
“alleged to have joined with the debtor corporation in defrauding 
creditors.”34  Because the Wagoner doctrine incorporates 
applicable state substantive law concerning in pari delicto,35 the 
district court considered New York law in ruling that the case 
should be dismissed.36 
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that the parties were in 
sharp dispute concerning the district court’s interpretation of 
New York law on the adverse-interest exception to the in pari 
delicto doctrine.37  On that basis, the Second Circuit certified 
questions on that issue to the New York Court of Appeals.38 
31 KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 946. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 946 (citing Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 
118 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 946 n.3 (explaining that while the District Court characterized the 
Wagoner rule as “an application of the substantive law of New York,” the Wagoner 
rule “is not part of New York law except as it reflects the in pari delicto principle”); 
see also Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 44 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining that the Wagoner rule refers to “dismissal of a bankrupt 
company’s damage claims where the company’s sole shareholder participated in the 
fraudulent scheme,” and describing the rule as “application of the in pari delicto 
doctrine or certainly . . . closely akin to it”). The dissent in the Kirschner case asserts 
that the Wagoner decision and its progeny have “incorrectly characterize[d] New 
York’s version of in pari delicto as a limitation on standing” and explains that under 
New York law, in pari delicto is an affirmative defense. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 
959–60 (Ciparik, J., dissenting). 
36 KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 947–48 (majority opinion). 
37 Id. at 948. 
38 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the Second Circuit asking 
the New York Court of Appeals to focus its attention on two of eight certified 
questions: “whether the adverse-interest exception is satisfied by showing that the 
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In its decision in the matter, the New York Court of Appeals 
began by explaining the basis for the in pari delicto doctrine is 
the principle that “courts will not intercede to resolve a dispute 
between two wrongdoers.”39  The court noted that the justice of 
the doctrine is apparent in cases where willful wrongdoer sues a 
party alleged to be negligent, but that the doctrine also applies 
when both parties engaged in willful misconduct.40 
In cases involving an organizational client, imputation is 
essential to in pari delicto’s application.  The New York Court of 
Appeals explained that both the acts of an organization’s agents 
and the knowledge they acquire “are presumptively imputed to 
their principals.”41  The court reasoned that principals select 
their agents, can only act through their agents, and should bear 
the risks of even the unauthorized acts of their agents.42 
The court explained that the only time it is inappropriate to 
presume communication of knowledge from agent to principal is 
when the principal is the agent’s intended victim.43  This is the 
adverse-interest exception to imputation: when the agent has 
“totally abandoned the principal’s interest,” then his knowledge 
is not imputed to the principal.44  If there is a benefit to both 
agent and principal, the adverse-interest exception does not 
apply.45  It is only when the corporation enjoys no benefit 
whatsoever—such as theft by the agent from the corporation—
that the exception applies, which means no imputation and the 
possibility of a malpractice suit.46  The court rejected the 
suggestion that the company’s ultimate bankruptcy is harm 
insiders intended to benefit themselves by their misconduct; and whether the 
exception is available only where the insiders’ misconduct has harmed the 
corporation”); see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 590 F.3d 186, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(describing the overarching question as whether the complaint’s allegations “satisfy 
the ‘adverse[-]interest’ exception” to the rule of imputing insider misconduct to the 
corporation, and then describing seven subsidiary questions). 
39 KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 950. 
40 Id.; see supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
41 KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d at 950. 
42 Id. at 950–51. 
43 Id. at 951. 
44 Id. at 952. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. The court further clarifies that fraud committed against the corporation 
would invoke the exception while fraud on its behalf does not. Id. 
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enough, reasoning that when fraud ultimately causes 
bankruptcy, it does not follow that the company’s agents totally 
abandoned the company.47 
The New York Court of Appeals then considered and rejected 
arguments for expanding the adverse-interest exception in order 
to make outside professionals responsible for professional 
negligence to organizational clients.48  First, the court considered 
whether the adverse-interest exception’s availability should 
hinge on subjective intent, namely whether the insiders intended 
to benefit themselves at the company’s expense, and that they 
either received such a benefit and/or that the company suffered 
long-term harm.49  The court rejected this formulation, stating 
that the exception would encompass every corporate fraud 
because fraudsters are not motivated by charitable impulses and 
the company “is always likely to suffer long-term harm once the 
fraud becomes known.”50 
Second, the court considered New Jersey’s approach of 
barring imputation of agent misconduct to the corporation in 
cases of professional negligence to the extent the recipient of 
recovery is an innocent shareholder51 and Pennsylvania’s 
approach of prohibiting imputation of agent misconduct in cases 
where the outside professional “had not proceeded in material 
good faith,” such as by colluding with company agents to defraud 
the company.52  The court understood the goal of such approaches 
as deterring third party professional misconduct and 
compensating innocent owners of these companies.53 
The New York Court of Appeals was not persuaded, and 
explained that it does not understand why the “innocent 
stakeholders of corporate fraudsters [should] trump those of 
innocent stakeholders of the outside professionals who are the 
defendants in these cases.”54  The court saw the equities lying 
47 Id. at 953. 
48 Id. at 954. 
49 Id. at 954–55 (citing In re CBI Holding Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 
2008)). 
50 Id. at 955. 
51 Id. (citing NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 890 (N.J. 2006)). 
52 Id. at 956 (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health 
Educ. & Research Found. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 335–36 
(Pa. 2010)). 
53 Id. at 957–58. 
54 Id. at 958. 
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with the outside professionals, and explained “the corporation’s 
agents would almost invariably play the dominant role in the 
fraud and therefore would be more culpable than the outside 
professional’s agents who allegedly aided and abetted the 
insiders or did not detect the fraud at all or soon enough.”55  The 
court asserted that there are already adequate disincentives to 
outside professionals participating in corporate client fraud 
without expanding the adverse-interest exception, noting 
settlements by underwriters and accounting firms in other 
cases.56  The court ultimately concluded that the “speculative 
public policy benefits” of an expanded adverse-interest exception 
did not outweigh the policies underlying current in pari delicto 
law.57 
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE IN PARI DELICTO DEFENSE IN A
MALPRACTICE CASE AGAINST THE BUSINESS ENTITY’S LAWYER 
This Part considers the various principles underlying 
application of the in pari delicto defense when a lawyer is sued 
for malpractice for failing to protect an entity client from legal 
liability at the hands of insiders.  Each principle is juxtaposed 
with attorney fiduciary duties to organizational clients.  In every 
case, there is conflict.  The rules that courts rely upon in 
applying in pari delicto are counter to a lawyer’s legal duties to 
organizational clients.  Further, the policies that courts claim are 
furthered by applying in pari delicto are not advanced in this 
context of organizational clients or successors in interest suing 
counsel for professional negligence. 
Some of the cases cited in this and the following Part are 
auditor malpractice cases.  It is useful to consider auditor 
malpractice cases because auditors and lawyers are both: 
(1) outside agents of the organizational client, and (2) sued for
failing to take action that would have protected the entity from
liabity.58  Even when a jurisdiction has not considered in pari
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 958–59. 
57 Id. at 959. 
58 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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delicto in the context of business lawyer liability, it is highly 
likely that the auditor liability analysis would be applied in a 
lawyer liability case.59 
A. Courts Impute an Agent’s Knowledge or Misconduct to the
Entity Client
Imputing the agent’s knowledge or conduct60 to the company
is a necessary step in the in pari delicto analysis in these 
malpractice cases.61  Without imputation, the company cannot be 
treated as equally responsible for the misconduct and barred 
from pursuing its claim.62 
Imputation is a step that is easily satisfied, because courts 
generally presume imputation is appropriate in the in pari 
delicto context.63  Some courts describe imputation in terms of 
imputing the agent’s knowledge to the principal.64  The 
Restatement (Third) of Agency section 5.03 provides that “notice 
of a fact that an agent knows” is imputed to the principal when 
59 The reasons that emerge for questioning the appropriateness of in pari delicto 
defense in the lawyer malpractice context may also provide reason to question the 
defense in the auditor malpractice context. However, because this Article does not 
analyze the auditor’s duties to the business client, it does not take a position on 
whether and how the in pari delicto defense should be reconceptualized in the 
auditor malpractice context. 
60 This Article and many cases generally refer to both knowledge and conduct 
being imputed to the organizational client. But see Deborah A. DeMott, Further 
Perspectives on Corporate Wrongdoing, In Pari Delicto, and Auditor Malpractice, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 341–342 (2012) (describing the distinction between 
attributing conduct and imputing knowledge to a principal). 
61 See, e.g., Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 404 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2005)Joint Equity Comm. v. Genovese, No.  . 
62 Id. at 404–05. 
63 See, e.g., Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton 
LLP, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the question of 
imputation “is not complicated” because there is settled law in California that an 
officer’s knowledge within the scope of his duties is imputed to the corporation). 
64 See, e.g., N.K.S. Distrib., Inc. v. Wheeler, Wolfenden & Dwares, P.A., No. 
N11C-11-146-JRJ, 2014 WL 4793438, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2014) 
(explaining that for purposes of applying in pari delicto, Delaware agency law 
requires court to impute agent knowledge to the principal unless agent’s interests 
were adverse); NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 879 (N.J. 2006) 
(asserting that pursuant to the common law of agency, the principal is “deemed to 
know facts that are known to its agent”); Chaikovska v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 913 
N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (asserting that, in discussing the application 
of the in pari delicto doctrine, “knowledge” of an agent acting within the scope of 
agency is imputed to the principal and the principal is bound by that knowledge 
even if it was never communicated). 
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the fact is material to the agent’s duties.65  Other courts describe 
imputation in terms of conduct.66  This is akin to the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency’s discussion of vicarious liability.67 
Regardless of whether a court in these cases is imputing 
knowledge or conduct, imputation is based entirely upon basic 
principles of agency law.68  The same principles are relied upon in 
cases in which a company and a third party are involved in tort, 
contract, or other litigation.69  The agent’s actions and knowledge 
are attributed to the principal and can result in the principal’s 
liability to a third party.70 
But reliance on agency principles as a basis for barring the 
malpractice claim is not legally sound.71  The law allows a 
company to sue its employees without imputation barring the 
company’s claims.72  Yet, these same jurisdictions bar comparable 
65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The provision 
notes that imputation does not apply if the agent acts adversely to the principal. Id. 
at § 5.04. 
66 See, e.g., Tolz v. Proskauer Rose LLP (In re Fuzion Techs. Grp., Inc.), 332 B.R. 
225, 230 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (“Normally, under agency principles, if the plaintiff 
acted wrongfully through an agent in the scope of that agency relationship, then the 
wrongdoing of the agent is attributed to the plaintiff.”); Am. Int’l. Grp. v. Greenberg 
(AIG I), 965 A.2d 763, 823 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that under New York law the 
agent’s knowledge and “the wrongdoing” is imputed to the corporation). 
67 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (describing 
principal’s vicarious liability to third party harmed by agent’s conduct). 
68 Id. at ch. 2, intro. note (“This Chapter states . . . the three distinct bases on 
which the common law of agency attributes the legal consequences of one person’s 
action to another person. . . . The three distinct bases for attribution are actual 
authority, apparent authority, and respondeat superior. . . . The legal consequences 
that these doctrines attribute to a principal are not consequences of agency doctrine 
itself but of other bodies of law.”). 
69 Id. § 6.01 (principal has contractual liability when agent with actual or 
apparent authority makes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal); id. § 7.03 
(describing circumstances in which principal has tort liability for agent’s conduct 
under principles of actual authority, apparent authority, and respondeat superior). 
70 Id. §§ 6.01, 7.03. 
71 See Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Whether or not 
application of the in pari delicto doctrine should depend on imputation rules 
borrowed from agency law is debatable.”); AIG I, 965 A.2d at 828 n.246 (questioning 
New York’s reliance on agency principles in the in pari delicto context and 
explaining, “[i]t is a policy judgment, not some rote conflation of contextually 
different questions of agency, that must determine whether . . . an auditor should 
face liability of professional negligence to its client corporation”). 
72 See, e.g., Claybrook v. Broad & Cassel, P.A. (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 
364 B.R. 562, 565 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (referencing the fact that, in dismissing 
claims against attorneys who participated with insiders in conduct that damaged the 
company, insiders were sued in a separate action and that the court refused to 
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claims against attorneys through imputation.73  In other words, 
imputation is used inconsistently depending on the identity of 
the agent.  But there is no substantive difference between 
insiders and attorneys: both are agents, owing fiduciary duties to 
a principal, who engaged in misconduct alleged to have 
proximately caused damages to that principal.74  A cause of 
action should be allowed to proceed against both without a bar 
via imputation. 
Moreover, applying agency principles to bar a malpractice 
claim is inconsistent with an attorney’s fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty to the entity client.75  A lawyer advising and assisting 
dismiss claims against them); Goldin v. Primavera Familienstiftung, Tag Assocs., 
Ltd. (In re Granite Partners, L.P.), 194 B.R. 318, 332 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“In 
pari delicto bars claims against third parties, but does not apply to corporate 
insiders or partners. Otherwise, a trustee could never sue the debtor’s insiders on 
account of their own wrongdoing.”); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., v. Greenberg (AIG II), 976 
A.2d 872, 876 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that AIG’s suits were allowed to proceed
against the company’s own officers and employees without consideration of in pari
delicto because “the doctrine does not have force in a suit by a corporation against its
own officers or employees”); Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., No.
1571-N, 2006 WL 4782378, at *33 n.132 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2006) (refusing to apply
in pari delicto based on imputation from insiders); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
73 See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 945 (N.Y. 2010). 
74 The Delaware Court of Chancery has explained that it is sound for the in pari 
delicto doctrine to be put aside so that a company—via a derivative suit—can pursue 
a claim against insiders who breached fiduciary duties to the company. AIG II, 976 
A.2d at 890 (“If there was illegal conduct, derivative plaintiffs may recover for the
harm that the corporation suffered when those fiduciaries knowingly caused the
corporation to violate positive law.”). The court went on to explain that the same
analysis supports allowing derivative suits against outside corporate agents like
auditors and counsel. Id. at 890 n.49 (“If these professionals fail in their duties as
gatekeepers, there is a strong argument to be made that they ought to be
accountable for their malpractice and not immunized by the very actions that were
not discovered due to their failure to meet expected professional standards.”).
75 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(2), (3) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000) (stating that a lawyer’s duty of care requires the lawyer to “act with 
reasonable competence and diligence” while duty of loyalty requires the lawyer to 
comply with obligations concerning confidentiality, avoid conflicts of interest, deal 
honestly with the client, and not take advantages from the relationship adverse to 
the client); id. § 16 cmt. b (stating that the rationale for § 16 is that the lawyer is a 
fiduciary); see also Kirschner v. K&L Gates, LLP, 46 A.3d 737, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2012) (describing attorney’s duty to client as including “both a duty of competent 
representation and the highest duty of honesty, fidelity, and confidentiality.”). A 
lawyer should face civil liability for violating these duties of care and loyalty if the 
violation is the legal cause of injury to the client. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48, 49. 
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an organizational client76 should face liability if he failed to 
protect the client from liability arising from agent misconduct 
when a reasonably prudent lawyer would have done so.77  While 
an attorney usually must accept instructions of the company’s 
authorized agents, that obligation changes when agents are 
planning to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct.78  Instead, 
a competent, loyal lawyer should inform other authorities within 
the company who can take action to protect the company.79  In 
76 The lawyer in this context is not a litigator acting as an advocate for the 
client in an adversary proceeding. See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE 
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 192–93 (2006) (contrasting the role and 
work of a corporate lawyer with that of a litigator). This lawyer is hired to advise 
and assist in a course of future conduct, not to zealously advocate in litigation for the 
client’s position concerning past events. Id. 
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 96(2), cmt. d, 
cmt. f, note to cmt. f (citing cases that stand for the proposition that an attorney has 
a duty to protect the organizational client against wrongful acts by constituents). 
See, e.g., FDIC v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 
California law for the proposition that it is an attorney’s duty to “protect his client in 
every possible way” and that an attorney fulfills this duty by acting with the “skill, 
prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly 
possess.”), rev’d, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (reversed on the grounds that the court applied 
federal and not state law), remanded to 61 F.3d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting 
earlier opinion with the exception of part concerning defenses in which earlier 
decision relied upon federal law); see also Harris, supra note 20, at 638 (explaining 
that if a lawyer’s loyalty is owed to an organizational client, then the lawyer has a 
duty to that client to prevent and/or limit the consequences of constituent fraud or 
crime that will harm the organization “through liability to third parties or 
otherwise”). 
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (explaining 
that if lawyer knows that constituent of an organization intends to act in a way that 
violates an obligation to the organization or that will be imputed to the organization 
and likely to result in substantial injury to it, then “the lawyer must proceed in what 
the lawyer reasonably believes to be the best interests of the organization”); id. § 96 
cmt. d (2000) (explaining that an agent’s instruction to the organization’s lawyer to 
perform, counsel, or assist in an unlawful act does not bind the lawyer and “does not 
remove the lawyer’s duty to protect the best interests of the organizational client”); 
see also Harris, supra note 20, at 638 (“If one takes the entity theory seriously, the 
lawyer for an organizational client must act . . . in a manner loyal to the interest of 
the entity and without regard to the direction of agents of the organization who are 
engaged in or complicit in wrongdoing. . . . The organizational constituent engaged 
in crime or fraud . . . is in effect disabled . . . from speaking on behalf of the client.”). 
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3) (attorney 
may seek review by higher authorities in the organization, “including referring the 
matter to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization.”); see, e.g., 
In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. 
Ariz. 1992) (“[W]here a law firm believes the management of a corporate client is 
committing serious regulatory violations, the firm has an obligation to actively 
discuss the violative conduct [and] urge cessation of the activity.”); Wechsler v. 
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other words, as a fiduciary, the lawyer has a duty to inform 
company decision makers of the material information that 
company agents are planning or are engaged in harmful 
wrongdoing.80  Further, it is in the organizational client’s interest 
for the lawyer to withdraw from the representation rather than 
facilitate an agent’s crime or fraud.81 
These fiduciary obligations of the organization’s attorney are 
embodied in professional conduct rules.82  These rules direct 
attorneys that they should not comply with instructions from 
company agents who want to engage in conduct that will create 
liability for the company.83  Further, the rules guide attorneys in 
steps they should take to protect the client from an agent’s 
Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 38–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(explaining that the plaintiff alleged a breach of the duty to exercise “reasonable 
care, skill, prudence and judgment” when lawyers “fail[ed] to advise members of [the 
client] of . . . factual information and legal considerations reasonably necessary to 
alert [the client] to the nature of its actions”). In addition, an attorney may also have 
an obligation of disclosure outside of the organization if doing so will protect the 
interests of the organization and is not prohibited by professional conduct rules. 
Paula Schaefer, Overcoming Noneconomic Barriers to Loyal Disclosure, 44 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 417, 434 (2007) [hereinafter Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure] (asserting that in a
jurisdiction that has adopted a loyal disclosure rule, it would be a violation of a
lawyer’s duties of loyalty and care to not disclose when doing so would protect the
organizational client).
80 William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
489, 501 (2016) (describing a lawyer’s duty to report up-the-ladder as broader than 
stated in Rule 1.13 because “under traditional fiduciary principles” a lawyer should 
provide the client with the material information needed to make decisions). 
81 See, e.g., Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. at 
1453 (explaining that if a lawyer cannot convince management to cease misconduct, 
the lawyer must “withdraw from representation where the firm’s legal services may 
contribute to the continuation of such conduct.”). 
82 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000) (explaining that professional conduct rules draw from preexisting 
legal requirements, including agency law); Paula Schaefer, A Primer on 
Professionalism for Doctrinal Professors, 81 TENN. L. REV. 277, 287–88 (2014) 
(explaining that some professional conduct rules, including Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.13, are based on lawyers’ fiduciary duties to clients). A 
violation of rules such as these—that describe the lawyer’s duty to a client—could be 
evidence in a claim for malpractice that the lawyer breached the duty owed to the 
client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., ¶¶ 10–11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2014). 
83 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) cmt. 3 (explaining that 
ordinarily a lawyer must accept decisions—even imprudent decisions—of agents for 
an organization, but that Rule 1.13(b) “makes clear” that when agents are engaged 
in conduct that violates a legal obligation to or on behalf of the organization, the 
lawyer must instead proceed in the best interests of the organization). 
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planned or ongoing misconduct, including up-the-ladder 
reporting84 and loyal disclosure.85  The rules were adopted in the 
post-Enron era to address concerns that attorneys were 
contributing to the bankruptcies of their corporate clients by not 
stopping agent fraud.86 
Explanations for why lawyers are required to treat the 
organizational client as having an interest in avoiding legal 
liability—even when company agents believe illegal conduct will 
be profitable for the company—include that a company’s 
obligation to act in compliance with law is the trade-off for 
limited liability87 and that this conception protects innocent 
stakeholders—nonagent owners and creditors of insolvent 
businesses.88 
84 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b), (c) (2016) (describing up-the-ladder reporting obligation 
when attorney “becomes aware of evidence of a material violation” by the issuer or 
an agent of the issuer); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (providing that 
when an organization’s attorney knows that a company agent is engaged in conduct 
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization that is a violation of a duty 
to the organization or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the 
organization, then the attorney must proceed in the best interests of the 
organization including referring the matter to higher authorities in the 
organization). 
85 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i), (iii); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c); 
see generally, Harris, supra note 20, 600–01 (explaining that disclosure of 
organizational client agent wrongdoing is “loyal” to the client if it precludes or limits 
the entity’s liability). 
86 Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the 
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1236–39 (2003) (describing post-Enron response of 
Congress and the SEC to address attorney obligations in the representation of 
corporate clients); Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79, at 424–32 (describing 
events leading up to the 2003 adoption of up-the-ladder and loyal disclosure 
professional conduct rules by the ABA and SEC following high profile corporate 
scandals in 2001). 
87 See Harris, supra note 20, at 651 (“The legitimate quid pro quo [for allowing 
limited liability organizations] may be that the legal system as a whole, including 
the lawyer engaged to represent the interests of the organization, will take that 
separate entity seriously.”). 
88 A. V. Pritchard, O’Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC: Imputation of Fraud and 
Optimal Monitoring, in 4 SUPREME COURT ECONOMIC REVIEW 179, 192–99 (Harold 
Demsetz et al. eds., 1995) (asserting that creditors prefer a legal framework that 
enlists fiduciary professionals in monitoring company agents for fraud; stating that 
while risk is desirable to shareholders “surely shareholders do not want managers 
committing fraud on the corporation’s behalf,” but ultimately concluding that with 
the boundaries of fraud murky that perhaps shareholders prefer a rule in which 
attorneys do not have liability for failing to detect and prevent agent fraud); Harris, 
supra note 20, at 639–40 (explaining it has been widely held that agents of an 
insolvent corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors). 
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Imputation in the in pari delicto context, which has the 
effect of barring claims against attorneys, is thus incompatible 
with the law of organizational attorney fiduciary duty in two key 
ways.  First, an attorney is not permitted to follow the directions 
of an agent who wants to engage in conduct that will create 
liability for the company.89  In other words, the law of fiduciary 
duty provides that company insiders lack actual and apparent 
authority when they ask an attorney to facilitate liability-
creating conduct.90  It is inconsistent then to attribute the 
conduct of these insiders to the company in order to bar the 
company’s claim against an attorney who breached his fiduciary 
duty by taking direction from those very insiders.  Second, the 
attorney’s duty includes providing notice or knowledge to higher 
authorities within the company.91  Imputing an agent’s 
knowledge to the company to defeat a claim against an attorney 
who was required but failed to provide notice of that same 
information to the company is illogical.92 
Another problem with imputation in this context is the issue 
of fault.  For in pari delicto to apply, the plaintiff should be “an 
active, voluntary participant in the unlawful activity that is the 
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (stating that there is an obligation to act in the best interest of the client 
when an agent “intends to act in a way that violates a legal obligation to the 
organization . . . or that reasonably can be foreseen to be imputable to the 
organization and likely to result in substantial injury to it”); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (requiring attorneys to protect the 
organization when an agent is engaged in conduct “that is a violation of a legal 
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be 
imputed to the organization”). 
90 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (serving as 
actual authority); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (serving as apparent 
authority). See also Simon, supra note 80, at 490–491 (client managers who ask 
lawyers to engage in conduct intended to deceive should not be understood to speak 
for the client). 
91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b). 
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b); see also Kevin H. Michels, The Corporate 
Attorney as “Internal” Gatekeeper and the In Pari Delicto Defense: A Proposed New 
Standard, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 318, 355 (2014) (asserting that the 
rationale for imputing knowledge of agent to principal breaks down in this context 
because the lawyer is “an additional agent of the corporation with reporting duties of 
her own.”). 
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subject of the suit.”93  Further, a plaintiff’s equal or even greater 
fault is traditionally a component of application of the in pari 
delicto doctrine.94  In many cases involving clients that are 
individuals instead of organizational clients, equal fault of 
attorney and client is a point of contention.95  The client typically 
argues that he or she did not know the law and was following the 
attorney’s advice, thus the attorney has greater fault.96  Courts’ 
analysis often centers around whether the client knew that her 
conduct violated the law.97  This kind of thoughtful analysis is 
typically absent in the malpractice cases involving attorneys and 
organizational clients.98  Courts act as if imputation answers the 
question of equal fault and no further analysis is needed.99 
93 Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 636 (1988); see also BrandAid Mktg. Corp. v. 
Biss, 462 F.3d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 2006). 
94 Pinter, 486 U.S. at 632 (citation omitted) (explaining the defense is “limited to 
situations where the plaintiff bore ‘at least substantially equal responsibility for the 
injury,’ and where the parties’ culpability arose out of the same illegal act”). 
95 See, e.g., Helbling v. Josselson (In re Almasri), 378 B.R. 550, 556 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2007) (denying dismissal of malpractice claim because court could not 
determine on the record whether client and attorney were at equal fault where 
client’s discharge was revoked because attorney did not list bank account and 
business in bankruptcy petition and schedules); Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d 
329, 334 (Mass. App. 2005) (affirming decision that in pari delicto barred client’s 
malpractice claim against attorney upon determining client and lawyer were equally 
at fault in client’s decision to commit perjury); McKinley v. Weidner, 698 P.2d 983, 
986 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that trial court did not have sufficient facts before it 
to dismiss case on basis of in pari delicto in that attorney, a “presumed expert in the 
law” may have greater fault than plaintiff for advice that plaintiff tender check with 
intent to dishonor it as part of a plan to recover a boat from a third party). 
96 Choquette, 836 N.E.2d at 334 (involving a client that asserted that given the 
“complexity of bankruptcy law” he relied upon attorney’s advice to lie under oath). 
97 Id. (“It is clear from the record that Choquette knew he was not making full 
disclosure and that he continued to resist making full disclosure.”). 
98 For example, in AIG I, the court explained that “if imputation applies, AIG is 
deemed to have participated in its directors’, officers’, and employees’ fraudulent 
schemes and AIG is deemed to have been as or more guilty of wrongdoing than its 
auditor, PWC, AIG is barred from recovering against PWC.” 965 A.2d 723, 824 (Del. 
Ch. 2009). Ultimately, the AIG I court dismissed the case against the auditor with 
no analysis of relative fault. The court explained this was appropriate under New 
York law because the complaint contained an allegation that company insiders acted 
with scienter. Thus, the company and the auditor were deemed to be at least equally 
at fault and in pari delicto required the complaint be dismissed. Id. at 827 n.245. 
99 See id. 
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Even if the knowledge or conduct of the agent is imputed to 
the principal/client, it does not follow that attorney and client are 
equally at fault.100  First, it is the lawyer’s role to competently 
advise about the law.101  Clients—and their agents—rely on 
attorneys to provide this advice.102  When a lawyer does not say 
“this is fraud” or “this will result in liability for the company,” the 
agent may not understand the implications of the conduct.103  The 
agent may understand that the conduct is unethical, but may 
think that it is nonetheless technically legal—in part because of 
the attorney’s advice or lack thereof.104 
100 See generally, Christine M. Shepard, Corporate Wrongdoing and the In Pari 
Delicto Defense in Auditor Malpractice Cases: A New Approach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 275, 324–33 (2012) (asserting that imputation should not be the basis of a 
determination of corporate client fault for purposes of in pari delicto and proposing a 
framework for determining fault in the context of auditor malpractice cases). 
101 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (citing §§ 52, 55, 56) (stating that a lawyer is liable to a client if the 
lawyer counsels or assists a client to engage in conduct that violates the rights of a 
third person to the extent that doing so violates the lawyer’s duty of care or other 
duty to the client under applicable law); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (obligating a lawyer to exercise “independent
professional judgment and render candid advice”).
102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(1); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1; see also Harris, supra note 20, at 642 (“A 
determination that constituents of the organization are engaged on behalf of the 
organization in crime or fraud with significant likely adverse consequences for the 
organization is . . . peculiarly within the province of the lawyer’s expertise and duty 
to the client.”). 
103 See, e.g., Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, 857 F. Supp. 2d 419, 
424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (involving three law firms having assisted company’s agents 
in defrauding investors by, among other things, creating a trust that was used to 
conceal misappropriated funds, approving private placement memoranda that 
contained material misrepresentations, and failing to perform due diligence that 
would have revealed the company was being operated as a Ponzi scheme); see also 
Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Of the Conditional Fee as a Response to Lawyers, 
Bankers and Loopholes, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 42, 46–47 (2011–2012) (explaining the 
circumstances in which lawyers providing advice and assistance in transactional 
matters engage in “creative envelope–pushing” that may ultimately result in 
liability for clients). 
104 Another explanation for treating the lawyer as having greater fault when the 
lawyer advises or facilitates wrongful conduct is that lawyers have a greater 
obligation than clients to ensure the integrity of the administration of justice. 
Vincent R. Johnson, The Unlawful Conduct Defense in Legal Malpractice, 77 UMKC 
L. REV. 43, 73 n.185 (2008) [hereinafter Johnson, Unlawful Conduct] (asserting that
attorney is arguably at greater fault than client when lawyer advises client to lie to
the court). Taking this argument a step further, lawyers have a greater obligation
than clients to ensure compliance with law.
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Further, even if the lawyer properly advised the agent of the 
prospect of liability and the agent still insisted upon the 
misconduct, it is also the lawyer’s obligation to provide 
information to other individuals in the company so that they can 
stop the company from engaging in the misconduct.105  The fact 
that one agent insisted on misconduct is not equivalent to a case 
in which the company’s highest authority was informed by 
counsel that the company could face liability and the company 
chose to engage in the misconduct anyway.106 
In determining if the company is at equal or greater fault 
than its lawyer, insiders’ understanding of the illegality and 
knowledge by the highest authority in the company should have 
a bearing on the issue.  These issues are ignored, though, when a 
court dismisses or enters summary judgment on a legal 
malpractice claim based entirely on the imputation 
presumption.107 
B. The Adverse-Interest Exception Does Not Apply When the
Business Entity Was the “Beneficiary” of the Agent
Misconduct
When the adverse-interest exception to imputation applies,
the plaintiff is allowed to pursue its legal malpractice action 
because the agent’s conduct is not imputed to the principal.108  
The narrow interpretation placed on the exception in many 
jurisdictions means that the business entity’s attorney has little 
to fear.109  In pari delicto will protect against liability.110 
105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3); see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b). 
106 See, e.g., Cobalt, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 424–25 (involving a complaint that 
alleged that law firm knew that company’s agent was misusing company funds but 
did not inform the company or its investors of that fact). 
107 MF Glob. Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 57 F. Supp. 3d 206, 
206–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (explaining that the in pari delicto doctrine can be applied at 
the motion to dismiss stage when its application is “plain on the face of the 
pleadings”). 
108 Center v. Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. 1985) (“To 
come within the [adverse-interest] exception, the agent must have totally abandoned 
his principal’s interests and be acting entirely for his own or another’s purposes.”). 
109 Id.; see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 952 (N.Y. 2010) 
(asserting that the adverse-interest exception “reserves this most narrow of 
exceptions for those cases—outright theft or looting or embezzlement—where the 
insider’s misconduct benefits only himself or a third party; i.e., where the fraud is 
committed against a corporation rather than on its behalf”). For a discussion of the 
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The adverse-interest exception provides that if the 
company’s agent was acting adversely to the principal’s interest, 
the agent’s knowledge or conduct should not be imputed to the 
company for purposes of in pari delicto.111  “Adverse” has been 
interpreted narrowly to mean acting in a manner that solely 
benefits the agent, such as when the agent is stealing from the 
company.112  Accordingly, if a manager stole money from the 
company, the company would not be prohibited from suing an 
attorney whose negligence facilitated the theft.113  The reasoning 
behind the exception is that an agent acting adverse to the 
principal would not have provided notice of the conduct to the 
principal, so imputation of knowledge is not appropriate.114 
The adverse-interest analysis of many courts turns largely 
on whether the corporation received any benefit, however slight 
or short lived, from the agent’s misconduct.115  Any benefit to the 
broader reading some jurisdictions have given the adverse-interest exception, see 
infra text accompanying notes 195–197. 
110 See, e.g., Hill v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP (In re ms55, Inc.), 338 B.R. 
883, 897–99 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) (granting summary judgment in favor of law 
firm, finding that undisputed facts reflected “valid business purposes” were at least 
one motivation for the allegedly fraudulent transactions facilitated by law firm). 
111 Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 952 (explaining that the law presumes the agent 
will communicate all information to the principal except under the narrow 
circumstances of the adverse-interest exception where the principal is the agent’s 
victim). 
112 Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that the 
adverse-interest exception applies when the agent acts to serve himself or a third 
party, with “the classic example being looting”); Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 952 
(describing the narrow exception as encompassing theft, looting, or embezzlement). 
113 Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 45 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (asserting that the adverse-interest exception may be appropriate 
because the Trustee alleged that the law firm defendant failed to stop an agent’s 
looting of the client, “which would appear to satisfy the requirement of a total 
abandonment of [the client’s] interests”). 
114 Center v. Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 828, 829–30 (N.Y. 1985) 
(explaining that “the presumption that knowledge held by the agent was disclosed to 
the principal fails because he cannot be presumed to have disclosed that which 
would expose and defeat his fraudulent purpose”). 
115 Oppenheimer-Palmieri Fund, L.P. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 802 F. Supp. 
804, 817 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating adverse interest does not apply “when the agent 
acts both for himself and the principal, though his primary interest is inimical to the 
principal”); Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 303 (Del. Ch. 
2015) (stating adverse-interest exception is inapplicable even when the “benefit” to 
the plaintiff is “outweighed by the long-term damage that is done when the agent’s 
mischief comes to light”). 
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company results in a finding that the exception does not apply.116  
For example, while conduct amounting to agent theft from the 
company is the one scenario in which the adverse-interest 
exception usually applies,117 even in this context, courts can deny 
the exception by finding that some benefit accrued to the 
company.  In In re Scott Acquisition Corp., company agents 
received help from company lawyers in structuring sales of 
company assets to the agents at amounts substantially below 
their fair value, followed by the company leasing the assets back 
from the agents.118  Company lawyers also acted on both sides of 
loan transactions between the company and insiders.119 
When the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee sued the lawyers for 
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, the lawyers asserted in 
pari delicto and argued that the adverse-interest exception did 
not apply.120  The lawyers asserted that the company received 
some benefit in that the money from the transactions “helped the 
[company] to pay down the [company’s] debt . . . and also 
demonstrated the [i]nsiders’ good faith belief in the long term 
viability of the [company].”121  The court admitted that “[t]hese 
benefits may seem somewhat trivial considering the alleged 
grandiose benefits that the insiders received from the 
transactions.”122  Nonetheless, the court found these trivial 
benefits sufficient to make the adverse-interest exception 
inapplicable, reasoning that the exception only applies when “the 
116 Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 353 B.R. 324, 368 
(Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that acts that are “ultimately injurious” to the 
company do not fall within the adverse-interest exception if they provide “an 
immediate benefit to the debtor at the expense of innocent third parties” and 
comparing the harm suffered by the debtor to the harm suffered by a robber who is 
imprisoned for his criminal misconduct as the “price of having enjoyed the 
temporary benefit of his ill-gotten gains”). 
117 Baena, 453 F.3d at 8. 
118 Claybrook v. Broad & Cassel, P.A. (In re Scott Acquisition Corp.), 364 B.R. 
562, 564 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (explaining that the insiders purchased the properties 
from the company at an amount just sufficient for the company to pay the lender, 
that shareholder approval was not requested, and that several insiders flipped the 
properties for substantial profit). 
119 Id. at 564–65. 
120 Id. at 568. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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agent acts entirely in his or her own interest with no benefit to 
the principal.”123 
The analysis is even easier when company agents engage in 
misconduct on behalf of the company with the assistance of 
counsel.124  The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit’s Cenco case is often cited for the proposition that “[f]raud 
on behalf of a corporation is not the same as fraud against it.”125  
It follows that fraud on behalf of the company is never adverse to 
it.126  Even when the conduct results in substantial liability for 
the company—as it typically does—the adverse-interest 
exception does not apply.127 
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the idea that a 
client’s ultimate bankruptcy amounts to harm for purposes of the 
adverse-interest exception.  The court explained that harm from 
discovery of the fraud cannot be the proper test because 
“disclosure of corporate fraud nearly always injures the 
corporation.”128  The court reasoned that, “[i]f that harm could be 
taken into account, a corporation would be able to invoke the 
123 Id. (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Grumman Olson Indus., 
Inc. v. McConnell (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 329 B.R. 411, 426 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
124 Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 353 B.R. 324, 368
(Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (quoting 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE LAW OR PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 829 (rev. ed. 2010)) (asserting that 
“[f]raud on behalf of a corporation is not the same thing as fraud against it” and 
explaining that the adverse-interest exception does not apply in cases in which there 
is some short term benefit to the corporation by the alleged misconduct). 
125 Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982). 
126 Id.; see also AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 827 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[I]n applying the in 
pari delicto doctrine, New York law does not embrace the notion that any conscious 
act of a fiduciary causing a corporation to break the law is against the corporation’s 
charter and best interests.”). 
127 See, e.g., Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, 857 F. Supp. 2d 419, 
434–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that legal malpractice claims against the Certilman 
law firm are barred under New York law because the client benefited from the 
fraud—that the firm facilitated—in that some of the funds raised by the fraud were 
used to pay promised returns to investors and the client retained some of the money 
raised through the fraud). The court refused to allow the receiver to re-plead, 
explaining that the receiver would have to allege the company “did not receive any 
benefit—inadvertent or otherwise—as a result of the . . . fraud,” and that such an 
allegation would contradict the allegations of the original complaint. Id. at 440; see 
also infra notes 195–197 and accompanying text for discussion of claims that were 
allowed to proceed under Connecticut and New Jersey law against two other law 
firm defendants in the Cobalt case. 
128 Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 953 (N.Y. 2010). 
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adverse-interest exception and disclaim virtually every corporate 
fraud . . . as soon as it was discovered and no longer helping the 
company.”129  It is only when the corporation is the intended 
victim, rather than the intended recipient, of the agent’s 
fraudulent scheme that the law presumes the agent will not 
communicate all material information to the principal.130 
This interpretation of the adverse inference exception fails to 
consider an attorney’s legal obligations.  Competent attorneys are 
bound to advise their clients’ agents against both stealing from 
the company and stealing for the company.131  Neither is in the 
company’s long-term financial interest.132  One creates liability 
from the agent to the company and one will result in liability for 
the company when it is discovered.133  It is not the lawyer’s 
proper role to bet on nondetection of liability-creating conduct or 
to weigh its possible benefits to a business entity client.134  A 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 952. 
131 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) 
(requiring attorneys to protect the organization when an agent is engaged in conduct 
“that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (obligating a lawyer to act 
in the best interest of the client when an agent “intends to act in a way that violates 
a legal obligation to the organization . . . or that reasonably can be foreseen to be 
imputable to the organization and likely to result in substantial injury to it”). 
132 See, e.g., Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that even 
though there is intuitive appeal to the suggestion that the only victims of corporate 
fraud are third parties, the company may also be a victim when we consider the long 
term consequences, as in cases like Enron). Anytime a company is engaged in 
conduct that creates substantial liability to third parties, the company will suffer 
harm when that liability is realized, owner value decreases, fines are incurred, 
and/or when the company is forced into bankruptcy. See, e.g., Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d 
at 945–46, 948–49. The New York Court of Appeals describes the circumstances 
leading to suit in the two consolidated cases. In the first case, when the Refco fraud 
was revealed, the resulting harm was the company’s bankruptcy for the company, 
precipitating the Litigation Trustee to file suit against the company’s lawyers and 
others. Id. at 945–46. In the other case, AIG’s fraud did not result in bankruptcy but 
instead, a reduction in stockholder equity, litigation and regulatory proceedings, and 
fines. This harm was the basis of the derivative suit filed by shareholders against 
AIG’s auditor. Id. at 948–49. 
133 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
134 Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79, at 439–40. Cf. Pritchard, supra 
note 88, at 186. Pritchard asserts that whether fraud benefits a corporation 
“depends on how often the corporation gets caught.” Id. While this may be true as an 
empirical matter, this view is inconsistent with a lawyer’s legal and professional 
conduct obligations when representing an organizational client. 
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competent lawyer may not simply withdraw from the 
representation, but is obligated to take action to protect the 
company’s interests in the face of agent misconduct that will 
create liability for the company.135 
It is absurd that the adverse-interest exception protects 
lawyers from liability in the very situation that should trigger 
lawyer liability.  As a fiduciary, a lawyer must protect an 
organizational client from an agent that orchestrates a 
fraudulent scheme to enrich the client.136  But a narrow 
interpretation of the adverse-interest exception provides that as 
long as the fraudulent scheme was meant to enrich the 
organization, the organization is barred from suing the attorney 
who failed to protect it.137  This is nonsensical.138 
Courts have expressed a fear that a broader reading of the 
adverse-interest exception would allow those who stand in the 
shoes of the company in litigation “to enjoy the benefit of 
[miscreant agent] misconduct without suffering the harm.”139  
But that argument misses three important points.  First, even if 
the adverse-interest exception is expanded, the company is not 
off the hook.  It will still have liability to third parties harmed by 
the misconduct.140  The only question in expanding the adverse-
interest exception is whether attorneys should escape liability for 
violating a duty to a client.  Second, holding outside counsel 
responsible to the company for his or her role in misconduct is no 
different from holding company insiders responsible to the 
135 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) cmt. f 
(explaining steps a lawyer may take to address an organizational client’s agent’s 
misconduct and noting that “a lawyer does not fulfill the lawyer’s duties to the 
organizational client by withdrawing from the representation without attempting to 
prevent the constituent’s wrongful act”). 
136 See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text. 
137 See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text (citing cases in which the 
adverse-interest exception does not apply because agents were engaged in profitable 
illegal conduct). 
138 Harris, supra note 20, at 632 (“[T]he problem with imputation analysis and 
the doctrine of adverse interest . . . in cases . . . against an organization’s lawyers, is 
its logical corollary: even if aware of fraud or criminal wrongdoing within an 
organizational client, the lawyer would have no duty to take steps to prevent that 
conduct (or at least no liability for failure to fulfill that duty) as long as the 
wrongdoers intended, however misguidedly, to benefit the organization.”). 
139 Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 238 N.E.2d 941, 959 (N.Y. 2010). 
140 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (describing 
principal’s vicarious liability to third party harmed by agent’s conduct). 
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company for their role in the misconduct.141  And third, holding 
an attorney responsible for his or her misconduct need not mean 
that counsel will bear the entire loss.142 
C. The Sole-Actor Exception to the Adverse-Interest Exception
Courts recognize an exception to the adverse-interest
exception when the agent who was engaged in misconduct and 
the company are one and the same.143  Because the adverse-
interest exception is based on the belief that an agent engaged in 
misconduct would not disclose that information to the 
organization,144 the sole-actor exception recognizes that if there is 
no one in the organization from whom knowledge can be 
concealed, then the organization should be imputed with 
knowledge.145  If there is identity between the agent and the 
company, then they are treated as one and the same.146  In short, 
the sole-actor exception recognizes that imputation is not 
appropriate when an agent is stealing from the company except 
when the thief is the company’s sole actor. 
The sole-actor inquiry is about control.  Once it has been 
established that the agent was acting adversely to the interests 
of the company, the debate in these cases turns to whether there 
was anyone else in control in the company that could have 
stopped the agent.147  The company—or the party standing in its 
141 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
142 See infra note 332 and accompanying text. 
143 Hagan v. Baird, 591 F. App’x 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2015) (refusing to apply the 
adverse-interest exception where “agent and principal are effectively one and the 
same, and in such a case, the agent’s fraudulent conduct will be attributed to the 
principal”); Mediators, Inc. v. Manney, 105 F.3d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[W]here 
the principal and agent are one and the same, the adverse-interest exception is itself 
subject to an exception styled the ‘sole[-]actor’ rule.”). 
144 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
145 Tolz v. Proskauer Rose LLP (In re Fuzion Technologies Grp., Inc.), 332 B.R. 
225, 237–38 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (explaining that in prior decisions, the sole-actor 
exception was applied when the agent was “either . . . the only sole shareholder, or 
had no one to whom he could impart his knowledge, or from whom he could conceal 
it”). 
146 Reider v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 784 A.2d 464, 472 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(explaining that when the sole owner loots the company, it is fair to impute “the self-
dealing conduct of the looter to the looted corporation”). 
147 Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, No. 06 Civ. 6468(KMW)(MHD), 
2009 WL 2058530, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2009) (explaining that the sole-actor rule 
can apply when multiple people control the corporation, when all of those people are 
involved in the fraud, and that the exception does not apply when the corporation 
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shoes—argues that there were other individuals who could have 
stopped the illegal conduct if they had been informed of it.148  The 
law firm or other third party defendant argues that the company 
was completely controlled by the individuals engaged in the 
misconduct.149 
It is inconsistent with the law of organizational attorney 
fiduciary duty that the “sole-actor” analysis only comes into play 
in the narrow circumstance of insiders stealing from the 
organizational client.150  A lawyer is obligated to act competently 
to protect the organizational client from liability anytime an 
insider is engaged in misconduct, whether stealing from the 
company or stealing for the company.151  If the company and the 
“has owners or managers who were innocent of the fraud and could have stopped the 
fraud if they had been aware of . . . it”); Fuzion Technologies, 332 B.R. at 239 
(holding that under the sole-actor exception to the exception, imputation is 
prohibited “[i]f there was at least one honest officer, director, shareholder, or other 
insider who would have taken appropriate action to rectify the wrongdoing”). 
148 Fuzion Technologies, 332 B.R. at 238 (explaining that the trustee argued that 
the sole-actor exception was inapplicable because certain directors and shareholders 
did not know about the agent’s fraud and “could and would” have taken steps to end 
the fraud if they had been advised of it); Sharp Int’l Corp. v. KPMG LLP (In re 
Sharp Int’l Corp.), 278 B.R. 28, 38–39 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying motion to 
dismiss by auditor finding allegations of complaint regarding an innocent thirteen 
percent  shareholder on the board who could have stopped the fraud sufficient to 
create question of whether the sole-actor rule was applicable). 
149  Sharp Int’l Corp., 278 B.R. at 38 (explaining that the defendant argued that 
the complaint supported the applicability of the sole-actor exception by alleging the 
company had only three officers who “ran the company and had control over the 
fraudulent transactions.”). 
150 Stated another way, it would be consistent with attorney fiduciary duty for 
the default rule to be no imputation of agent misconduct to the company for 
purposes of in pari delicto, whether stealing from or for the company, except when 
the agent is the company’s “sole actor.” Even then, this Article would define a 
company controlled by a sole actor—that is, one for which imputation is 
appropriate—in very narrow circumstances in which the company has no other 
innocent stakeholders that the lawyer could have protected. See infra notes 327–329 
and accompanying text. This is a different interpretation of sole actor than courts 
that attempt to broadly define sole actor as an exception to the adverse-interest 
exception so that imputation is appropriate. See, e.g., USACM Liquidating Tr. v. 
Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221 (D. Nev. 2011) (describing 
interpretations of sole actor within the no innocent decision-maker rule that allow a 
conclusion of sole actor—and thus, allow imputation—even when there were other 
decision makers in the company who lacked veto power). 
151 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) 
(requiring attorneys to protect the organization when an agent is engaged in conduct 
“that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization or a violation of law that 
reasonably might be imputed to the organization”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
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bad sole actor are one and the same, then imputation may be 
appropriate.  Otherwise, imputation should not bar a claim 
against counsel regardless of the variety of agent misconduct. 
D. Dismissal of Such Claims Protects the Sanctity of the Courts
as Bodies That Do Not Mediate Disputes Between
Wrongdoers
A stated policy underlying the in pari delicto doctrine is
protection of the sanctity of the courts.152  Courts refuse to 
participate in resolving disputes between wrongdoers in order to 
avoid becoming a party to the misconduct.153 
It is ironic then that courts in business lawyer malpractice 
cases regularly and seriously give consideration to attorney 
arguments that a claim should be dismissed because counsel was 
facilitating beneficial illegal conduct.154  This argument is 
necessary to avoid the adverse-interest exception, because if 
illegal conduct benefited the business in the short term, then 
agent conduct is imputed to the company and in pari delicto 
applies.155  But of course it is also a violation of a lawyer’s 
fiduciary duty to her client to have participated in illegal but 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (obligating lawyers to act in 
the best interest of the client when an agent “intends to act in a way that violates a 
legal obligation to the organization . . . or that reasonably can be foreseen to be 
imputable to the organization and likely to result in substantial injury to it”). 
152 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) 
(holding that one of two underlying grounds supporting the doctrine is “that courts 
should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers”). 
153 Id. 
154 See, e.g., Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006) (“A fraud by top 
management . . . is not in the long-term interest of the company; but . . . it profits 
the company in the first instance and the company is still civilly and criminally 
liable.”); Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC v. Shapiro, No. 06 Civ. 6468(KMW)(MHD), 
2009 WL 2058530, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2009) (finding that the adverse-interest 
exception is inapplicable where the corporation benefits to any extent from agents’ 
fraud); Kirschner v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07 Civ. 11604(GEL), 2009 WL 
1286326, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2009) (determining that the adverse-interest 
exception does not apply because the illegal conduct was beneficial to Refco, and 
noting that “[i]ndeed, the gravamen of the Trustee’s allegations is not that the 
insiders stole assets from Refco, but rather that the insiders’ fraudulent scheme was 
to steal for Refco”). 
155 Shapiro, 2008 WL 833237, at *7. 
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profitable misconduct.156  So, rather than avoiding entanglement 
in misconduct, courts are using the violation of an attorney’s duty 
as grounds for rewarding the attorney with a dismissal. 
Dismissing an attorney malpractice claim is fundamentally 
different from dismissing a case against a “classic” co-
conspirator.  Take an example from the AIG II case.157  AIG had 
conspired with the company General Reinsurance Corporation 
(“Gen Re”) to make it appear that AIG had a legitimate insurance 
contract.158  As a result of the transaction, AIG was able to report 
a fake $500 million increase in its insurance reserves and 
premiums, while Gen Re was paid $5 million for its part in the 
conspiracy.159  When the conspiracy was uncovered, both 
companies faced substantial liability and AIG paid an $825 
million settlement.160  When AIG shareholders filed a derivative 
suit against Gen Re, the Delaware Court of Chancery explained 
that Delaware’s in pari delicto doctrine barred the claim.161  
Concluding that no exception should apply to allow the claim, the 
court explained such exceptions would require courts to engage 
in inefficient accounting.162  Because both conspiring parties had 
their own motives, neither is the victim and could assert claims 
against the other.163  In sorting out such claims, “the court would 
have to look at each of the corporate wrongdoers, examine how, 
why, and through whom each committed illegal acts, and then 
come to some ultimate determination of how costs should be 
shifted among conspirators” and may devolve to the court 
determining “[which company] got more of the take from the 
scheme relative to its harms.”164 
156 32 C.F.R. § 776.69 (2016). 
157 AIG II, 976 A.2d 872, 877 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
158 Id. at 879. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 883 (“In applying the doctrine [under Delaware law], there is no doubt 
that under the general rule, AIG is barred from recovering against the Third-Party 
Defendants[, including Gen Re].”). 
162 Id. at 893. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 894. In contrast, the Chancery Court explained that a claim against a 
lawyer or auditor for malpractice is more akin to a claim against an insider for 
breach of fiduciary duty to which in pari delicto is inapplicable. Id. at 889–90, n.49. 
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Unlike the AIG-type co-conspirator, a lawyer is engaged to 
provide a legitimate service: legal advice and assistance to an 
organizational client.165  A legal malpractice claim relies upon 
allegations that the lawyer failed to act in a reasonably prudent 
manner and the client was harmed as a result.166  Considering 
the merits of such a claim is not unseemly, as it would have been 
in looking at AIG’s claim against Gen Re; it is what courts do in 
any legal malpractice case.167 
By dismissing these legal malpractice claims without 
consideration, the courts are signaling that there are no 
consequences to lawyers for violating fiduciary duties to 
organizational clients.168  Ironically, the application of in pari 
delicto in these cases makes courts participants in lawyer 
misconduct. 
E. Denying Relief to Plaintiffs in Such Cases Deters Illegality
Courts also justify the in pari delicto doctrine on the ground
that it deters illegal conduct.169  Courts assert that applying the 
doctrine incentivizes businesses to use care in selecting and 
supervising agents.170  One court explained that imputation for 
165 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (describing a lawyer’s duties to a client as including advancing the 
client’s lawful objectives, acting competently and diligently, fulfilling duties of 
loyalty, and fulfill valid contractual obligations). 
166 Id. § 48 (describing the elements of a claim against a lawyer for professional 
negligence). 
167 Id. 
168 Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 960 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparik, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the majority’s holding regarding application of the in pari 
delicto doctrine creates “a per se rule that fraudulent insider conduct bars any 
actions against outside professionals by derivative plaintiffs or litigation trustees for 
complicitous assistance to the corrupt insider or negligent failure to detect 
wrongdoing”); see also Michels, supra note 92, at 342 (describing the Kirschner 
decision as “effectively insulat[ing] attorneys from all liability [except in the case of 
theft from the client] for failure to report an executive’s wrongdoing to higher-ups in 
the organization”). 
169 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985) 
(finding that one of two underlying grounds underlying in pari delicto is that 
“denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring 
illegality”). 
170 See Goldin v. Primavera Familienstiftung, Tag Assocs., Ltd. (In re Granite 
Partners, L.P.), 194 B.R. 318, 328 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (asserting that denying 
relief to a wrongdoer through the in pari delicto doctrine deters illegal conduct); 
Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 951 (“The risk of loss from the unauthorized acts of a 
dishonest agent falls on the principal that selected the agent.” (quoting Andre 
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purposes of applying in pari delicto recognizes “that principals, 
rather than third parties, are best-suited to police their chosen 
agents and to make sure they do not take actions that ultimately 
do more harm than good.”171 
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in the Cenco case is often 
relied upon for its deterrance analysis.172  The court framed the 
issue as weighing two alteratives to determine which would have 
a greater deterrent effect on corporate fraud: allowing the 
company to shift the entire cost of fraud to a negligent auditor or 
not allowing such cost shifting.173  The court admitted that 
holding a third party auditor liable for its negligence might cause 
it and firms like it to be “more diligent and honest in the 
future.”174  But the court went on to reason that if the company is 
allowed to shift the cost of wrongdoing “entirely to the auditor,” 
that would reduce the incentive to hire honest managers and 
monitor their behavior.175  Even though the court recognized that 
many shareholders do not play an active role in hiring and 
supervising managers, the court explained that the shareholders 
delegate this duty to the board and should bear responsibility 
when the board-selected managers commit fraud on behalf of the 
company.176  While recognizing that the company and its 
shareholders may not ultimately be net beneficiaries of such 
Romanelli, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 875 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009))). But 
see Welt v. Sirmans, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1396, 1402 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (asserting that 
permitting a bankruptcy trustee to recover against debtor’s former attorneys “would 
not send unqualified signals to shareholders that they need not be alert to 
managerial fraud since they may later recover full indemnification for that fraud 
from third party participants”). 
171 Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 953. 
172 See, e.g., id. (relying on Cenco for the proposition that “the presumption of 
imputation reflects the recognition that principals, rather than third parties, are 
best-suited to police their chosen agents and to make sure they do not take actions 
that ultimately do more harm than good” (citing Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 
686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982))). 
173 Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455 (“From the standpoint of deterrence, the question is 
whether the type of fraud that engulfed Cenco . . . will be deterred more effectively if 
Cenco can shift the entire cost of the fraud from itself . . . to the independent auditor 
who failed to prevent the fraud. We think not.”). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 455–56. 
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fraud, the court reasoned that shareholders should not be able to 
escape all responsibility by holding a third party—in this case, 
the auditor—responsible.177 
There are two significant flaws in this deterrence analysis. 
First, the company—whether through shareholders, boards, or 
other managers, depending on the form of the entity—typically is 
not in a better position than company lawyers to monitor and 
stop illegal conduct by agents on behalf of the company.178  It is 
the lawyer’s role to know the law, to advise about conduct that 
could result in legal liability, and to seek out higher authorities 
in a company who will take the steps necessary to avoid liability 
by correcting course.179  Shareholders, boards, and upper-level 
management are much less likely to have knowledge about 
company agents and their conduct than the participating 
lawyer.180  In fact, those other groups are relying upon the 
lawyers to help them monitor the insiders.181  So, as between 
shareholders and boards on one hand and attorneys on the other, 
attorneys are in the better position to deter misconduct if they 
have the incentive to do so.182 
The second flaw is in framing the question as whether the 
company should be able to shift “all responsibility” to third party 
professionals.183  Holding attorneys liable for their negligence 
177 Id. at 456. 
178 Pritchard, supra note 88, at 197 (“[S]hareholders are not realistically in any 
position to monitor their managers’ conduct toward third parties, and shareholders 
might well be willing to pay higher fees to accountants and lawyers who help ferret 
out fraud by the corporation.”); DeMott, supra note 60, at 348–49 (discussing that 
organizational clients in these cases had contracted for “expert monitoring services 
that shareholders and directors lack expertise to provide”). 
179 See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra note 178. 
181 Michels, supra note 92, at 356 (acknowledging the rationale that imputation 
encourages principals to monitor agents, but noting the “irony of allowing this 
rationale to justify the wholesale rejection of a corporation’s claims against their 
failed lawyer gatekeeper”); see supra note 178. 
182 Recent Case, Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941 (N.Y. 2010), 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1797, 1802–03 (2011) (asserting that the Kirschner decision will not 
have the desired effect of deterring corporate wrongdoing because it denies recovery 
to the company who hired outside professionals to ensure legal compliance while 
immunizing professionals who were in a position to prevent wrongdoing). 
183 See, e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455–56 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
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does not mean that the full responsibility for damages arising out 
of corporate fraud will be shifted to attorneys.184 
Greater deterrence of illegal conduct could be accomplished 
by not permitting the in pari delicto defense in these cases.  A 
lawyer, as a fiduciary, has an obligation to act competently and 
loyally to protect an organizational client from liability at the 
hands of misguided insiders.185  If lawyers are never held 
accountable to their clients for failing to do so, there is little 
incentive to perform this difficult job.186  Civil liability is a 
powerful enforcement mechanism.187  The prospect of malpractice 
liability would give lawyers a strong financial incentive to fulfill 
fiduciary duties to their clients.188 
Courts sometimes assert that lawyers already have adequate 
incentives to fulfill these duties.  These incentives include 
potential suits by the victims of the fraud, the prospect of 
professional discipline, and the possibility of criminal liability.189  
184 See infra notes 330–332 and accompanying text. 
185 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
186 The lawyer-advisor’s job is particularly difficult because of the strong 
pressure to please client decision makers. See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the 
Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and 
Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1245 (2011) (describing 
the psychological risk involved in anxious-to-please lawyers “ ‘get[ting] comfortable’ 
with what the client proposes”). In order to protect business clients from fraud 
liability, lawyers must not focus on technical compliance with some aspect of the law 
but rather upon moral intuition about whether clients are engaged in a 
misrepresentation that may amount to fraud. Eric C. Chaffee, An Interdisciplinary 
Analysis of the Use of Ethical Intuition in Legal Compliance Decisionmaking for 
Business Entities, 74 MD. L. REV. 497, 523–25 (2015) (describing how a lawyer’s 
“[m]oral [i]ntuition [h]elps to [p]rotect [b]usiness [e]ntities”). 
187 In contrast, if we conceptualize the attorney’s duty to intervene to prevent 
serious misconduct as solely an ethical obligation to protect the public, then it is 
unlikely that lawyers will take the duty seriously because of the lack of 
consequences. See COFFEE JR., supra note 76, at 230 (“Academics with tenure are 
notoriously demanding of practitioners struggling to survive in competitive markets. 
But the overlooked problem with their prescription is its implementation. Ethical 
norms lack any meaningful mechanism for their enforcement, and bar associations 
are not about to take action against attorneys for failing to consider the public 
interest.”). 
188 The Cenco court, which ultimately barred an auditor malpractice claim based 
on in pari delicto, acknowledged that allowing the claim to proceed would incentivize 
auditors to be “more diligent and honest in the future.” Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455. 
189 See, e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 958 (N.Y. 2010) (“[A]n 
outside professional . . . whose corporate client experiences a rapid or disastrous 
decline in fortune precipitated by insider fraud does not skate away unscathed. In 
short, outside professionals—underwriters, law firms and especially accounting 
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This argument overlooks the rarity of these other forms of 
liability.190  It also fails to recognize that civil liability would 
provide an added incentive for law firms—not just individual 
lawyers—to manage risk in this area, which may result in 
greater protection of business clients.191  Finally, discipline, 
criminal liability, and civil liability to third parties do not 
compensate the victim of the lawyer’s professional failing: the 
organizational client.192  The client should be compensated for the 
harm caused by its fiduciary’s failures, irrespective of the 
prospect of other liability for the lawyer.193 
III. IN PARI DELICTO VARIATIONS: ARE THESE APPROACHES
MORE CONSISTENT WITH BUSINESS ATTORNEY FIDUCIARY DUTY? 
Some jurisdictions have taken a more flexible approach to in 
pari delicto in the context of business entity claims against 
attorneys and auditors who have failed to protect their business 
clients from liability.194  Some jurisdictions have created new 
exceptions to the doctrine, while others have found the doctrine 
inapplicable against certain categories of plaintiffs.  In exploring 
firms—already are at risk for large settlements and judgments in the litigation that 
inevitably follows the collapse of an Enron, or a Worldcom or a Refco or an AIG-type 
scandal.”). 
190 Id. (noting that many third party professionals have settled suits with 
shareholders in the same cases, but the lawyers are not listed among those who 
settled). Of course, attorney Joseph Collins was convicted for his role in the fraud. 
See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Such convictions would have a deterrent 
effect on attorney participation in client fraud if they were not so rare. 
191 Law firms have civil liability exposure for their lawyers’ malpractice, but do 
not face professional discipline. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2014) (providing for discipline for lawyers, and not law firms); see also Vincent 
R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice in a Changing Profession: The Role of Contract
Principles, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 489, 492–93 (2013) (asserting that despite the
existence of other attorney conduct enforcement mechanisms, discipline and
malpractice suits “form the essential backbone of modern legal ethics”).
192 NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 887 (N.J. 2006) (allowing an 
auditor to escape liability for its negligence violates principles of fairness and does 
nothing to deter auditor wrongdoing in the future). 
193 It is a valid concern that uncapped exposure to liability may have negative 
implications for lawyers, auditors, and their clients. See, e.g., AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 
828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009). However, there are ways to address these concerns short 
of insulating lawyers and auditors from malpractice liability. 
194 As in the prior Part, this Part also considers auditor cases in addition to 
lawyer cases. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
cases are analogous). 
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these and other variations, this Part considers whether these 
approaches are more consistent with attorney fiduciary duty 
than the stricter approach discussed above. 
A. Broader Reading of the Adverse-Interest Exception
Some jurisdictions have interpreted the adverse-interest
exception broadly enough to encompass conduct that only 
provides the “benefit” of temporarily extending the life of an 
insolvent company.195  In other words, the agent misconduct will 
be treated as adverse to the company if temporary life support 
was the only benefit provided.196  The impact of this exception 
will mean no imputation, and as a result, the possibility of 
liability for lawyers.197 
Expanding the adverse-interest exception to include agent 
misconduct when the only benefit is temporarily delaying the 
company’s death is more consistent with an attorney’s obligations 
to act in the best interests of clients in the face of an agent’s 
liability-creating conduct.198  It recognizes that the client’s cause 
of action against an attorney should not be foreclosed when the 
only benefit to the client was a meaningless one. 
However, this exception misses the mark by not going far 
enough.  For example, assume that a solvent company’s agents 
seek an attorney’s assistance defrauding third parties for the 
benefit of the company.  Even though an attorney has a fiduciary 
duty to the company to protect it in this situation,199 an attorney 
who instead facilitates the misconduct could successfully invoke 
the in pari delicto defense if sued for malpractice.  Even if the 
jurisdiction employs an expanded adverse-interest exception like 
195 Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347–48 (7th Cir. 1983) (prolonging 
company’s insolvency is a detriment to the company); Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, 
LLC v. Shapiro, 857 F. Supp. 2d 419, 431–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that under 
Connecticut and New Jersey law, the adverse-interest exception is available if the 
fraudulent conduct only extended the life of an insolvent company); NCP Litig. Tr., 
901 A.2d at 888 (“[W]e find that inflating a corporation’s revenues and enabling a 
corporation to continue in business ‘past the point of insolvency’ cannot be 
considered a benefit to the corporation.”). 
196 Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1348. 
197 Cobalt Multifamily Inv’rs I, LLC, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 435 (allowing the 
Receiver’s claims to proceed against law firms under Connecticut and New Jersey 
law). 
198 See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text. 
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that described here, it would not apply in our hypothetical 
scenario because the fraud was not used merely to extend the life 
of an insolvent company.200  Accordingly, this expansion is a step 
in the right direction, but does not fully address the issue.201 
B. Bad Faith Exception
In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny
Health Education & Research Foundation v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (“AHERF”),202 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that an agent’s fraud will not be imputed to 
the principal in cases in which a third party does not deal in good 
faith with the principal.203  In the case, AHERF’s auditor Coopers 
& Lybrand (“C&L”) allegedly colluded with AHERF’s CFO to 
misrepresent the company’s finances.204  The court noted that 
public policy considerations should come into play in determining 
the availability of in pari delicto and acknowledged the 
competing policies at play.205  The court explained the important 
role that imputation plays in protecting people who transact 
business with corporations.206  From there, the court determined 
that imputation of agent misconduct is appropriate when the 
200 Cf. supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
201 Another interpretation of the adverse-interest exception that is more 
consistent with attorney fiduciary duty is found in Colorado where the exception 
encompasses fraudulent conduct. See Okimoto v. Yougjun Cai, No. 13 Civ. 
4494(RMB), 2015 WL 3404334, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015) (acknowledging that 
Colorado extends the adverse-interest exception to include not only fraud and looting 
but also fraud related misconduct, such as agents making fraudulent 
misrepresentations in corporate filings). To the extent that this exception would still 
allow the imputation of profitable but illegal—but not fraudulent—misconduct of 
company agents, this exception is not fully aligned with the law of attorney fiduciary 
duty. 
202 989 A.2d 313, 313 (Pa. 2010). In the case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
accepted certification of two questions on petition of the Third Circuit of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals. Id. at 318. 
203 Id. at 339. 
204 Id. at 317 (describing how AHERF’s CFO allegedly “knowingly falsified 
corporate finances” with the assistance of C&L agents who issued a “clean” audit 
despite their knowledge of the fraud, resulting in the AHERF board’s deception to 
the detriment of AHERF). 
205 Id. at 330–31. The court concluded that the state does not agree with the 
degree to which the Cenco decision prioritizes “incentivizing internal corporate 
monitoring over the objectives of the traditional schemes governing liability in 
contract and in tort, including fair compensation and deterrence of wrongdoing.” Id. 
at 332. 
206 Id. at 335. 
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third party acted in good faith, even if the third party was 
negligent.207  Thus, in pari delicto would continue to be available 
in such cases.208 
The court concluded that a different rule should apply in 
cases of collusion between auditor and company agent, because 
the justification for imputation—protecting third parties who 
rely on the agent’s authority—is absent.209  The court reasoned it 
would be “ill advised, if not perverse,” to impute knowledge to the 
corporation when the auditor “actively and intentionally” 
prevented the corporation’s governing body from receiving 
knowledge of the fraud.210  The court asserted that its holding is 
supported by agency principles, arguing that such principles do 
not justify imputation when secretive, collusive activity occurred 
between auditor and agent.211  Accordingly, the court held that 
“defensive imputation” is available to a defendant who dealt with 
the principal in good faith and is unavailable where the 
defendant “materially has not dealt in good faith with the 
principal.”212 
There is a principled reason to expand the imputation 
exception beyond cases of attorney bad faith.  The AHERF court 
attempts to draw a line between cases when the third party 
professional should or should not be protected in his or her 
reliance upon agent authority.213  The problem with this line 
drawing in the case of an attorney is that an attorney is never 
justified in relying upon the agent’s authority to engage in 
misconduct on the company’s behalf.214  Whether the attorney is 
207 Id. This is the appropriate outcome considering the principal’s responsibility 
for empowering the agent and determining it does not undermine tort and contract 
law to deny recovery where the agent’s culpability exceeded that of the defendant. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 336. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 337. 
212 Id. at 339; see also Kirschner v. K&L Gates LLP, 46 A.3d 737, 764 (Pa. 2012) 
(concluding that allegations that law firm favored interests of company CEO over 
that of the client during its investigation of CEO’s alleged fraud amounted to an 
allegation of bad faith sufficient to overcome imputation under Pennsylvania law). 
213 See supra notes 206–212 and accompanying text. 
214 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) cmt. d (AM 
LAW INST. 2000) (“[A] lawyer is not bound by a constituent’s instruction to a lawyer 
to . . . assist future or ongoing acts that the lawyer reasonably believes to be 
unlawful. Such an instruction also does not remove the lawyer’s duty to protect the 
best interests of the organizational client.”). 
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negligent in failing to report the agent’s misconduct up-the-
ladder or intentionally colludes with the agent to hide the 
misconduct from higher authorities in the company, the outcome 
is the same for the organizational client: the attorney has 
deprived the principal/client of information that the attorney had 
a legal obligation to provide.215  In both cases—negligent conduct 
and intentional misconduct—the attorney had a duty not to allow 
the misguided agent to speak on behalf of the principal/client.216  
The attorney should have liability in both cases217 and should 
find no shelter by imputing the insider’s misconduct to the 
organizational client. 
C. The Innocent Decision-Maker Exception
Some courts within the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit have recognized an “innocent decision-maker” 
exception to the in pari delicto doctrine.218  Courts applying this 
exception have refused to impute agent fraud to the company 
when there was at least one decision maker among the 
company’s managers or shareholders who was both innocent of 
the misconduct and could have stopped it if he or she had been 
215 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) 
(describing professional conduct obligation to report agent misconduct up-the-
ladder); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3) 
(explaining the attorney’s obligation to act in the best interests of the organizational 
client in the face of conduct that will cause substantial liability to or for the 
organization). 
216 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(3). 
217 Id. § 96, cmt. f (discussing whether a lawyer should have liability for failing 
to take appropriate measures to address constituent misconduct is judged by 
whether the attorney violated the duty of care—that is, whether the attorney acted 
with the competence normally exercised under similar circumstances by lawyers). 
218 Sharp Int’l Corp. v. KPMG LLP (In re Sharp Int’l Corp.), 278 B.R. 28, 36–39 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (refusing to dismiss case where plaintiff alleged presence of 
an innocent shareholder on the board with the ability to end the fraudulent activity); 
Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 49 F. Supp. 2d 644, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(permitting plaintiff to re-plead to allege innocent manager who could have 
prevented fraud in auditor malpractice case); Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, 
Plesent & Scheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing plaintiff to 
amend complaint to allege existence of innocent member of management who could 
have prevented fraud if he had known of it); CEPA Consulting, Ltd. v. Touche Ross 
& Co. (In re Wedtech Secs. Litig.), 138 B.R. 5, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (refusing to 
dismiss accountant malpractice case on basis that agents engaged in misconduct 
were not the company’s sole shareholders). 
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made aware of it.219  The Second Circuit has not had occasion to 
resolve the issue,220 but has noted the possibility that the rule is 
an outgrowth of a misunderstanding about the sole-actor 
exception.221  Outside of the Second Circuit, it does not appear 
that courts recognize such an exception.222 
This innocent decision-maker exception aligns well with 
lawyer fiduciary duty.  As noted earlier, lawyers have a duty to 
act prudently to protect an organizational client from liability.223  
One step toward fulfilling this obligation is reporting concerns of 
agent misconduct up-the-ladder to higher authorities in the 
organization.224  This allows the innocent decision makers in the 
company to protect it from liability.225  Even when company 
management refuses or fails to address the misconduct, 
professional conduct rules in some jurisdictions permit lawyers to 
protect entity clients by taking the additional step of revealing 
information outside of company management, such as to a 
shareholder who could pressure the company to address the 
issue.226 
219 Wechsler, 212 B.R. at 36 (deciding that imputation is only appropriate if “all 
relevant shareholders and/or decisionmakers are involved in the fraud”). 
220 CBI Holding Co., Inc. v. Ernst & Young, 529 F.3d 432, 447 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(finding the adverse-interest exception applicable and concluding it was unnecessary 
to address an innocent-insider exception); Bennett Funding Grp., Inc. v. Kirkpatrick 
& Lockhart LLP, 336 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2003) (deciding it was unnecessary to 
resolve the legal issue of an innocent decision-maker exception because there was no 
innocent decision maker under the facts). 
221 CBI Holding Co., Inc., 529 F.3d at 470 n.5. 
222 Baena v. KPMG LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding no authority for 
an innocent decision-maker exception under Massachusetts law); USACM 
Liquidating Tr. v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221 (D. Nev. 
2011) (“To the extent some courts have fashioned an innocent[-]insider exception to 
imputation or in pari delicto, as opposed to the sole[-]actor rule, the Court concludes 
Nevada would not follow those decisions.”); Cohen v. Morgan Schiff & Co., Inc. (In re 
Friedman’s Inc.), 394 B.R. 623, 633–34 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (noting that its 
decision does not turn on an innocent decision-maker exception to imputation). 
223 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
225 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. f (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000) (describing steps the lawyer may take to protect the organization as 
including referring the matter to “someone within the organization having authority 
to prevent the prospective harm” or seeking intervention from the board or 
independent directors). 
226 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i), (iii) (2016); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.13(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); see also Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79 
(discussing that, when confidentiality rules do not prohibit disclosure, a lawyer’s 
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When a lawyer does not give an innocent decision maker the 
opportunity to act, the lawyer has deprived the company of the 
opportunity to avoid liability.  In this scenario, it is sensible that 
the lawyer should not be allowed to invoke the in pari delicto 
defense; even though some of its agents were involved in 
misconduct, other agents may have acted to protect it if they had 
been given the opportunity.227 
Courts and commentators have dismissed the innocent 
decision-maker exception as a misunderstanding of the sole-actor 
exception to the adverse-interest exception.228  They note that the 
innocent decision-maker exception is the flip side of the sole-actor 
exception—and the sole-actor exception only comes into play 
when an agent is stealing from the company and not when the 
agent is engaged in misconduct for the benefit of the company.229 
A misunderstanding may very well be the origin of the 
innocent decision-maker exception.230  Nonetheless, the innocent 
decision-maker exception achieves a result consistent with 
attorney fiduciary duty.  It recognizes: (1) that both stealing from 
and stealing for the organizational client are against client 
interests, and (2) if the lawyer could have told an innocent 
decision maker who could have protected the client but did not, 
fiduciary duty to organizational client obligates lawyer to disclose confidences when 
doing so will protect the organizational client). 
227 See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text, for reasons why conduct 
should not be imputed to the organizational client under such circumstances. It is 
arguable that the existence of an innocent stakeholder—even one who has no 
management role and thus is not a decision maker—is grounds to avoid imputation. 
For additional discussion, see infra notes 328–329 and accompanying text. 
228 CBI Holding Co., Inc. v. Ernst & Young, 529 F.3d 432, 448 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(finding the district court judge’s analysis of an innocent decision-maker exception 
“and its likely genesis as a product of courts’ confusion regarding the relationship 
between the normal rule of imputation, the adverse[-]interest exception to that rule, 
and the sole[-]actor exception to be extremely persuasive”); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. 
Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 825 (Del. Ch. 2009) (finding that the trend in New York is 
“strongly against” an innocent insider exception); Jonathan Witmer-Rich & Mark 
Herrmann, Corporate Complicity Claims: Why There Is No Innocent Decision-Maker 
Exception to Imputing an Officer’s Wrongdoing to a Bankrupt Corporation, 74 TENN. 
L. REV. 47, 91 (2006) (arguing that the innocent decision-maker exception is a
doctrinal error mischaracterizing the sole-actor exception and should be rejected).
229 CBI Holding Co., Inc., 529 F.3d at 447 n.5; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d at 
825; Witmer-Rich & Herrmann, supra note 228, at 91. 
230 The authorities cited at supra note 228 are certainly persuasive that this is 
the reason the exception developed. But the fact that the exception was arrived at 
through a misunderstanding does not undercut the fact that it is legally sound for 
the reasons explained here. 
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the lawyer has not fulfilled the duty owed to his or her 
organizational client.231  As long as courts continue to categorize 
some agent misconduct as being in the company’s interest,232 
courts will not recognize the logic of a broad innocent decision-
maker exception.  After all, what is the value of an attorney 
alerting an innocent decision maker in an effort to stop what may 
be considered beneficial misconduct? 
D. Special Treatment for Claims Brought by Bankruptcy
Trustees or Receivers
Section 541 of the bankruptcy code provides that the
property of the bankruptcy estate includes “all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case.”233  Most courts have concluded that anyone standing in the 
shoes of the company is subject to all defenses against it at the 
time the case commenced—that is, those defenses that would 
have been good against the company—including in pari delicto.234  
However, a minority of courts have determined that bankruptcy 
trustees should not be subject to the in pari delicto defense, 
reasoning that it is equitable to allow the trustee to recover on 
behalf of the innocent creditors.235 
231 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2), (3) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000). 
232 See supra notes 115–130 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ 
distinction between profitable and harmful illegal conduct). 
233 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West 2014). 
234 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 
1145, 1150 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that a claim subject to the defense of in pari 
delicto at commencement of bankruptcy is subject to the same defense when brought 
by the bankruptcy trustee); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. RF Lafferty & 
Co., Inc., 267 F.3d 340, 357 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that § 541 expresses Congress’s 
intent that the bankruptcy trustee have the same claims and be subject to the same 
defenses as the debtor at the commencement of the bankruptcy); Hill v. Gibson 
Dunn & Crutcher, LLP (In re ms55, Inc.), 338 B.R. 883, 893 n.4 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
2006) (“Whether subjecting the bankruptcy trustee to an in pari delicto defense is 
good policy or bad, it is good bankruptcy law.”). 
235 See, e.g., Tolz v. Proskauer Rose LLP (In re Fuzion Techs. Grp., Inc.), 332 
B.R. 225, 231 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005). Two law review articles have influenced 
courts’ debate about the wisdom of applying in pari delicto to bankruptcy trustees: 
Tanvir Alam, Fraudulent Advisors Exploit Confusion in the Bankruptcy Code: How 
In Pari Delicto Has Been Perverted To Prevent Recovery for Innocent Creditors, 77 
AM. BANK. L.J. 305, 330 (2003) (asserting bankruptcy trustee should not be subject 
to in pari delicto because it is an equitable defense and the beneficiaries of the claim 
are innocent creditors), and Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto 
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Outside of the § 541 setting, some courts have determined 
that receivers, in various contexts, should not be subject to the in 
pari delicto defense on public policy grounds.236  For example, in 
Reneker v. Offill, a Northern District of Texas court determined 
that a court-appointed special receiver in an SEC enforcement 
action should not be barred by in pari delicto from pursuing 
client AmeriFirst’s legal malpractice claims.237  The receiver 
asserted that the lawyers had committed malpractice by failing 
to properly advise AmeriFirst in offering securities for sale to the 
public, resulting in liability to third parties.238  The law firm 
asserted that in pari delicto applied because two AmeriFirst 
agents were engaged in fraudulent conduct related to offering the 
securities.239  The court did not impute the agents’ conduct to 
AmeriFirst, reasoning that the distinction between agents and 
corporation is reinforced by appointment of a receiver and that in 
pari delicto would undermine the goal of the receivership, which 
is ultimately to turn over proceeds to the receivership estate for 
the defrauded investors and other innocent victims.240 
Doctrine Has Nothing to Do with What Is § 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 519, 522 (2005) (arguing that as a matter of federal 
bankruptcy policy, in pari delicto should not bar claims brought by the bankruptcy 
trustee who is acting on behalf of innocent creditors). See also Marc S. Kirschner, In 
Pari Delicto Doctrine in Lawsuits Against Third Parties After Failed Leveraged 
Buyouts, 23 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. ART. 2, at *6 (2014) (discussing public 
policy arguments favoring innocent trustees as representatives of creditors not being 
subject to the in pari delicto defense). 
236 See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754–55 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding 
that, in the context of fraudulent conveyance action, appointment of receiver 
removed the wrongdoer such that in pari delicto should not bar the claim); Klein v. 
Widmark, No. 2:11–cv–01097, 2015 WL 5038543, at *5 (D. Utah Aug. 26, 2015) 
(allowing receiver to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim without the bar of in pari 
delicto, reasoning that the recovered funds would not benefit the wrongdoer); Zayed 
v. Associated Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 13–232(DSD/JSM), 2015 WL 4635789, at *3 (D.
Minn. Aug. 4, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss, reasoning that appointed receiver
was not subject to in pari delicto defense). While the foregoing cases are not
malpractice claims, they are relevant to the present Article because of the special
treatment for receivers in bringing claims that would otherwise be barred by in pari
delicto.
237 No. 3:08–CV1394–D, 2012 WL 2158733, at *26–27 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2012). 
“AmeriFirst” as used in this Article includes three separate AmeriFirst entities 
referred to in the court’s opinion as the “AmeriFirst Clients.” Id. at *1. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at *26. 
240 Id. at *26–27. 
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While a bankruptcy trustee or receiver is innocent, he or she 
is not particularly special in this regard.  The true plaintiffs in all 
of these cases are businesses,241 all of which the lawyer should 
understand as having an interest in avoiding legal liability.242  
While some owner-agents of the business may have engaged in 
misconduct, other stakeholders may not have.  Those who have 
not engaged in misconduct legitimately expect their investment 
in the business to be protected by all of its agents—inside 
managers and outside counsel alike.243  So even though the 
business is appropriately held accountable to third parties for its 
agents’ misconduct,244 it does not follow that the business should 
be barred from pursuing claims against its agents—outside and 
inside—who caused it to suffer that liability.245  At the end of the 
day, a trustee or receiver exception does not address the 
underlying problem: the mechanical application of agency 
principles in legal malpractice cases deprives every business of 
the ability to sue its outside counsel for malpractice. 
E. No Imputation Against Innocent Claimants
In the case NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG LLP,246 the New
Jersey Supreme Court considered whether a litigation trust, as 
successor to the corporation’s claims, could bring a malpractice 
claim against an auditor who negligently failed to detect 
company fraud.247  The fraud was related to the company’s 
reported revenues and expenses; when the fraud was revealed, 
241 See supra note 13–14 and accompanying text (describing who files suit on 
behalf of the businesses in these cases). 
242 Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79, at 423 (explaining that attorneys 
should understand that organizational clients have an interest in avoiding legal 
liability). 
243 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stating that 
an agent has a duty to act with care, competence and diligence); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (defining 
standard of care owed by attorney to client for purposes of a claim of professional 
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty). 
244 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (describing principal’s liability for 
tortious acts of agent). 
245 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that the law has 
always allowed inside agents to be sued in this context). 
246 901 A.2d 871 (N.J. 2006). 
247 The Trust alleged claims of “negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach 
of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. at 876. 
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the company was forced to declare bankruptcy.248  The court 
decided that the trustee should be allowed to pursue the cause of 
action, but that individuals who participated in or could have 
prevented the fraud should not be able to enjoy a recovery.249  
The court explained that imputing an agent’s conduct to a 
principal makes sense in the context of protecting innocent third 
parties, such as a party who negotiates a contract with the 
company’s agent, but that the rationale for imputation breaks 
down in the in pari delicto context.250  This is because imputing 
the agent’s conduct to the principal results in absolving the 
negligent auditor.251  On this basis, the court held that a party 
who contributes to the misconduct—in this case, the auditor—
cannot invoke imputation, so a claim can be brought for damages 
proximately caused by that party.252 
Turning to the issue of whether the trust should be allowed 
to bring the claim, the NCP court rejected the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s application of Illinois 
law in the seminal Cenco case.253  The NCP court noted that 
events in the twenty years since Cenco was decided indicate that 
auditors need to be more alert to corporate fraud and courts must 
take steps to address that fraud.254  The court explained Cenco’s 
concern with compensating agents who had participated in the 
fraud, but rejected the idea that the solution is to bar any 
recovery.255  For this reason, the NCP court determined that only 
innocent shareholders should have a recovery and that 
imputation is appropriate to bar claims by shareholders who 
participated in the fraud, those who should have been aware of 
248 Id. at 873. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 879–80. The court does not actually use the phrase in pari delicto but 
instead discusses imputation for purposes of determining if an auditor malpractice 
claim should be dismissed. 
251 Id. at 880. “Allowing KPMG to avoid liability for its allegedly negligent 
conduct would not promote the purpose of the imputation doctrine—to protect the 
innocent.” Id. at 882. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 885. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
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the fraud because of their role in the company, and those who 
own a large enough block of stock that they have the ability to 
conduct oversight.256 
The New York Court of Appeals recently rejected the NCP 
approach.257  The New York court framed the issue as a dispute 
between innocent stakeholders of the company and innocent 
stakeholders of the outside professionals.258  The court reasoned 
that the company’s agents were more culpable than the outside 
professional’s agents in most cases, and concluded the company’s 
innocent stakeholders should not prevail over the professional’s 
innocent stakeholders.259 
The New York Court of Appeals’ analysis overlooks the 
critical fact that the outside professional was hired by the 
company for the purpose of competently representing the 
company’s interests.260  If that professional failed to act 
competently and the company suffered damage as a result, the 
company’s innocent owners can trace their injury to the conduct 
of the professional.  It follows that the negligent professional 
should pay the client for the damage caused, and the innocent 
owners should enjoy their proportionate share of that recovery.261  
Even if the company’s inside agents were more culpable than the 
outside professionals, that is not a justification for allowing the 
professionals to avoid being held accountable to the company.262  
As to why the innocent owners of a professional firm should 
suffer a loss via the professional firm’s liability in this scenario, 
256 Id. at 885–86. 
257 Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 958–59 (N.Y. 2010). 
258 Id. at 958 (“[W]hy should the interests of innocent stakeholders of corporate 
fraudsters trump those of innocent stakeholders of the outside professionals who are 
the defendants in these cases?”). 
259 Id. (“[T]he corporation’s agents would almost invariably play the dominant 
role in the fraud and therefore would be more culpable than the outside 
professional’s agents who allegedly aided and abetted the insiders or did not detect 
the fraud at all or soon enough.”). 
260 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (describing an attorney’s duties to a client). 
261 Id. § 48 (discussing that a lawyer has liability to a client for professional 
negligence if the lawyer fails to exercise the competence and diligence normally 
exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances and that failure is the legal cause of 
the client’s injury). 
262 Of course, fault could be apportioned between inside and outside 
professionals in the company’s lawsuit against both groups. See infra notes 330–332 
and accompanying text. 
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this is when basic agency principles should come into play.  The 
professional firm is liable because its agent created liability for 
the firm while acting within the scope of his or her professional 
duties.263 
The “innocent claimant” rule announced by the NCP court 
does not address some concerns, however.  First, the plaintiff 
asserting a malpractice claim against a professional typically is 
either the client or a third party standing in the shoes of the 
client, such as a trustee or receiver, and not a third party who is 
not in privity with the professional, such as a shareholder of the 
client.264  While a shareholder may ultimately receive any 
recovery by the client in a malpractice case, shareholders are not 
the plaintiffs in these actions.  Yet, the NCP court does not 
explain how or why it would be appropriate to examine the 
misconduct of such shareholders separately for purposes of 
imputation.265  Second, the court holds that noninnocents entitled 
to no recovery include “shareholders who engaged in the 
fraud . . . those who, by way of their role in the company, should 
have been aware of the fraud[, and those] . . . shareholders [who], 
by virtue of their ownership of a large portion of stock, have the 
ability to conduct oversight.”266  Even if it were possible to treat 
different shareholders differently for purposes of recovery,267 it 
would not be consistent with the law of attorney fiduciary duty to 
prevent recovery to those shareholders who should have known 
about the misconduct and those who should have been able to 
conduct oversight because of their size.268  An attorney who—
263 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (describing 
principal’s liability for tortious acts of agent). 
264 See, e.g., In re MF Glob. Holdings Ltd. Inv. Litig., 611 F. App’x 34, 37–38 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (finding that claims brought on behalf of audit client’s customers were 
properly dismissed because auditor cannot be sued for professional negligence except 
by client or someone with a relationship “so close as to approach that of privity”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 (describing that a 
plaintiff in a professional negligence action is a person to whom a lawyer owes a 
duty of care). The professional’s duty of care is owed to the client and not to owners 
of the client. Id. §§ 50, 51 (describing lawyer’s duty of care to clients and a narrowly 
defined list of nonclients, which would not include owners of a client). 
265 NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871, 885–86 (N.J. 2006). 
266 Id. at 886. 
267 The dissent questions how thousands of such determinations would be made 
and calls the majority approach impracticable. Id. at 905 (Rivera-Soto, J., 
dissenting). 
268 See supra notes 75–86 and 91–92. 
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even negligently—failed to protect the company against agent 
misconduct should not be able to avoid paying those who should 
have known of the misconduct.  It is the company’s attorney 
these owners should have been able to rely upon in this regard.269 
IV. THE CASE FOR ALIGNING THE IN PARI DELICTO DOCTRINE
WITH ORGANIZATIONAL ATTORNEY FIDUCIARY DUTY
Following news of Enron and other high-profile corporate 
scandals in 2001, commentators asked, “Where were the 
lawyers?”270  Why didn’t lawyers stop fraudulent conduct by 
insiders and protect these companies from financial ruin?271  
Commentators rightly insisted the lawyers shared a measure of 
the blame for these cases of misconduct and the subsequent 
bankruptcies, but noted that lawyers were not held 
accountable.272 
Sixteen years after Enron, not much seems to have 
changed.273  Other companies have faced substantial liability and 
269 See supra notes 75–86 and 91–92. 
270 Ashby Jones, Where Were the Lawyers?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2007, 8:52 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/01/02/where-were-the-lawyers (stating that implicit in 
the question “[w]here were the lawyers?” in Enron era is the “assumption that 
lawyers . . . could have done more to keep their companies out of hot water”); see also 
Dan Ackman, Enron’s Lawyers: Eyes Wide Shut?, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2002, 12:16 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/28/0128veenron.html (asserting that Enron attorneys 
Vinson & Elkins “asked few real questions, failed to talk to obvious key witnesses 
and then blessed Enron’s treatment of controversial partnerships”). 
271 Ackman, supra note 270. 
272 Julie Hilden, Scummery Judgment: Why Enron’s Sleazy Lawyers Walked 
While Their Accountants Fried, SLATE.COM (June 21, 2002, 10:45 AM), http://www. 
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2002/06/scummery_judgment.ht
ml (“[Y]ou would think Vinson & Elkins should be accountable because it was the 
firm retained by Enron to investigate Sherron Watkins’ internal complaints. The law 
firm’s investigation was inarguably a disaster for the company. But in the end, 
Enron got what they paid for—and thus it seems Enron, not V & E, should be 
faulted for the fact that the investigation did not go further than it did . . . .”). 
273 Paul Lippe, Volkswagen: Where Were the Lawyers?, ABA J. (Oct. 13, 2015, 
9:05 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/volkswagen_where_were_the_ 
lawyers (asserting that if Volkswagen’s lawyers had been “engaged enough” in the 
business to know about the software the company had installed in eleven million 
diesel cars to cheat emissions tests then they likely would have prevented it); Alice 
Woolley, The Volkswagen Scandal: When We Ask “Where Were the Lawyers?” Do We 
Ask the Wrong Question?, SLAW: COLUMN (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.slaw.ca/2015/ 
09/30/the-volkswagen-scandal-when-we-ask-where-were-the-lawyers-do-we-ask-the-
wrong-question (stating that the “where were the lawyers” question suggests that 
lawyers can do better by preventing unlawful things from happening). 
1050 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1003  
have been destroyed by fraudulent schemes of company 
insiders.274  But lawyers have largely escaped liability to the 
clients they have harmed.275  The in pari delicto doctrine is the 
reason.  Even when lawyers fail to fulfill their duties to 
organizational clients, they are not held accountable because in 
pari delicto provides a complete defense.276 
This has broad implications for the legal profession.  Basic 
fiduciary duty principles dictate that an attorney should act as a 
competent, loyal lawyer would to protect an organizational client 
from agent misconduct that will result in liability—and often 
bankruptcy—when discovered.277  Yet, the in pari delicto defense 
has been a roadblock to a robust body of case law developing in 
this area.278  Decisional law could explain the contours of a 
lawyer’s fiduciary duty and help lawyers and law firms develop 
best practices for addressing misconduct of an organizational 
client’s agents.279 
274 See Lippe, supra note 273 (regarding the Volkswagen emissions scandal and 
likely legal liability for the company). 
275 The Refco case provides an example. Joseph Collins engaged in criminal 
misconduct with his client’s agents that ultimately bankrupted the client, yet the in 
pari delicto doctrine provided a complete defense to his client’s legal malpractice 
action against Collins and his law firm. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 626 F.3d 673, 674, 
677–78 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of malpractice claims against Mayer 
Brown on the ground that the adverse-interest exception does not apply). 
276 Id. at 678. 
277 FDIC v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Part and 
parcel of effectively protecting a client, and thus discharging the attorney’s duty of 
care, is to protect the client from the liability which may flow from promulgating a 
false or misleading offering to investors.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2), (3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000); see also supra notes 75–86 
and accompanying text. 
278 For example, the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers describes the 
lawyer’s duty to act in the best interests of the organizational client in the face of 
insider conduct that will create liability to or for the client, but the notes to that 
section only cite a small number of cases that stand for that proposition. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) cmt. f (citing six 
cases that stand for the proposition that an attorney has a duty to protect the 
organizational client against wrongful acts by constituents). Even though there is 
such a duty, in pari delicto largely prevents such cases proceeding and resulting in 
reported decisions. 
279 Among other issues, such cases would reference expert testimony on the duty 
of a reasonably prudent attorney addressing insider crime and fraud. See, e.g., FDIC 
v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1550–51 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting conflicting expert
testimony on whether attorneys breached duty to client bank by failing to “ferret
out” client’s agent’s fraud, that jury was properly instructed, and that adequate
proof supported jury verdict of lawyer negligence). The development of such case
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Without that body of case law or, more significantly, the 
prospect of liability, lawyers are unlikely to take the fiduciary 
duty to protect organizational clients seriously.280  Saying no to a 
scheme to defraud third parties is difficult, as is up-the-ladder 
reporting and loyal disclosure.281  Even though upholding these 
obligations can protect an organizational client from liability, 
lawyers risk losing a client by fulfilling these duties.282  If there is 
no downside to lawyers turning a blind eye to, or even 
facilitating, agent misconduct, then lawyers will be disinclined to 
meet their legal obligations as fiduciaries.283 
Deconstructing the pillars of the in pari delicto defense in 
business attorney malpractice cases reveals a great irony.  The 
attorney’s defense depends upon principles that are inconsistent 
with the attorney’s legal duty to the organizational client.  To 
fulfill a fiduciary duty to an organizational client whose agents 
are engaged in fraudulent or criminal conduct, a lawyer is 
required to disregard instructions of those agents and take 
steps—including advising against misconduct and up-the-ladder 
reporting—to protect the client from liability, without regard to 
law, including law in cases in which the fraud was intended to enrich the 
organizational client, would further the interests of the legal profession and 
organizational clients. 
280 Harris, supra note 20, at 638 (explaining that taking the entity theory of 
organizational client seriously means recognizing that the lawyer has a duty to 
prevent and/or limit the consequences of client crime or fraud); Hill & Painter, supra 
note 103, at 43 (asserting that malpractice law theoretically discourages 
incompetent legal advice—that is, advice that ignores the true meaning of the law 
and ultimately contributes to a company’s bankruptcy—but that the in pari delicto 
doctrine makes it difficult to pursue these claims); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST 
& HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 136–51 (2006) 
(describing the expectations of those who deal with fiduciaries and the adverse 
consequences of treating lawyers and other professionals not as fiduciaries but as 
businesses). 
281 See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical 
Obligation of Transactional Lawyers To Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 
38–42 (2003) (discussing the financial disincentive to lawyers acting in the best 
interests of the organizational client). 
282 Id. 
283 Pritchard, supra note 88, at 192 (“The Cenco imputation rule invites 
fiduciaries to neglect their duty to ferret out fraud by corporate insiders because 
even if they are negligent, there will be no damages assessed against them for their 
malfeasance. A rule that is not backed by a monetary sanction is likely to have a 
very low rate of compliance.”). 
1052 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1003  
whether the conduct is profitable in the short run.284  Ironically, a 
lawyer who negligently or intentionally ignores this obligation 
can invoke the in pari delicto defense knowing that courts will: 
(1) attribute an agent’s misconduct to the organizational client,
even where the lawyer took no steps, such as up-the-ladder
reporting, to protect the client,285 and (2) treat profitable illegal
conduct as being in the company’s interest.286  It makes no sense
that the very reasons the lawyer should face liability are the
reasons lawyers are given a complete defense to liability.287  And
though it would be logical to do so, courts act as if refusing
imputation in this context is akin to denying that gravity
284 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) 
(“When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions 
ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is 
doubtful. . . . Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that 
the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other 
constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of 
law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is 
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (stating 
that if a lawyer knows that a constituent of an organization intends to act in a way 
that violates an obligation to the organization or that will be imputed to the 
organization and likely to result in substantial injury to it, then “the lawyer must 
proceed in what the lawyer reasonably believes to be the best interests of the 
organization”); id. § 96(3) (describing steps lawyer must take in the interest of the 
client, including up-the-ladder reporting); id. § 96(3) cmt. d (explaining that an 
agent’s instruction to the organization’s lawyer to perform, counsel, or assist in an 
unlawful act does not bind the lawyer and “does not remove the lawyer’s duty to 
protect the best interests of the organizational client”). 
285 See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 108–130 and accompanying text. For example, in Kirschner, 
the court asserts that for the adverse-interest exception, we cannot find that the 
exception applies based on the harm that flows from the discovery of the fraud. The 
court asserts that “[i]f that harm could be taken into account, a corporation would be 
able to invoke the adverse-interest exception and disclaim virtually every corporate 
fraud—even a fraud undertaken for the corporation’s benefit—as soon as it was 
discovered and no longer helping the company.” Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 
N.E.2d 941, 953 (N.Y. 2010). But this is not an outrageous proposition that the 
company lawyer who is supposed to protect the organizational client from even 
profitable illegal conduct should have liability for failing to do so. See supra note 284 
and accompanying text. 
287 A similar irony exists in the case of auditors’ protection from malpractice 
liability. Shepard, supra note 100, at 326 (explaining that “it is only in those cases 
where the very thing auditors are retained to help guard against—fraud—exists that 
the in pari delicto defense has worked to immunize auditors from answering for 
their own potential wrongdoing”). 
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exists.288  Imputing agent conduct to a principal makes sense 
when a third party is injured by the acts of an agent,289 but that 
does not mean these same principles should be applied for 
purposes of in pari delicto. 
There are strong policy grounds for changing course from 
current in pari delicto precedent.  Policy matters in the in pari 
delicto context.  The United States Supreme Court has refused to 
apply in pari delicto when doing so undermines a policy that 
would be furthered by allowing a co-conspirator to bring a cause 
of action.290  On this basis, the Court has found the doctrine 
should not bar claims of co-conspirator plaintiffs in the areas of 
securities law and antitrust law.291  Likewise, other courts should 
refuse to apply the doctrine in this organizational attorney legal 
malpractice context.  Here, the important public policy is that 
lawyers should have an incentive to act competently to protect 
288 Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 303 (Del. Ch. 2015) 
(describing imputation in the in pari delicto context as harsh to the innocent 
corporation, but “essential to the continued tolerance of the corporate form”); 
Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 950–51 (explaining why agent conduct should be imputed 
to principal and concluding that, “[i]n sum, we have held for over a century that all 
corporate acts—including fraudulent ones—are subject to the presumption of 
imputation”). But see AIG I, 965 A.2d 763, 828 n.246 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that 
whether an auditor should face malpractice liability in such cases is a “policy 
judgment” and need not be answered by “some rote conflation of contextually 
different questions of agency”). 
289 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 6.01–6.03, 7.03–7.08 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2006); see also id. ch. 2, intro. note (“This Chapter states . . . the three distinct 
bases on which the common law of agency attributes the legal consequences of one 
person’s action to another person. . . . The three distinct bases for attribution are 
actual authority, apparent authority, and respondeat superior. . . . The legal 
consequences that these doctrines attribute to a principal are not consequences of 
agency doctrine itself but of other bodies of law.”). Even the Kirschner court, which 
was rigid in its insistence upon relying upon imputation in the in pari delicto 
context, appears to recognize that advocates for a different rule are not suggesting 
that agency principles be jettisoned in this context. See Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 954 
(“No one disputes that traditional imputation principles . . . should remain 
unchanged—indeed, are essential—in other contexts.”); see also sources cited supra 
note 288. 
290 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 311 (1985) 
(determining that in pari delicto should bar a co-conspirator’s private securities 
fraud cause of action only if preclusion would not significantly interfere with the 
policy underlying federal securities laws and the co-conspirator bears at least 
substantially equal responsibility for the violation). 
291 Id. at 315 (determining that denying in pari delicto defense was appropriate 
to advance policy of protecting the investing public that underlies securities fraud 
law). 
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their organizational clients against the liability that flows from 
agents engaging in misconduct.292  Only if the “co-conspirator”—
that is, the company or its successor in interest—is allowed to 
bring this cause of action will that policy be advanced.293  While 
courts have traditionally asserted that applying in pari delicto 
deters misconduct, that is not the case in this context.  In fact, 
the opposite is true: allowing these legal malpractice cases to 
proceed would give lawyers an incentive to say no to the schemes 
of their clients’ agents.294  Further, reaching the merits of these 
cases will not amount to courts mediating disputes between 
wrongdoers.295  Instead, it will bolster the reputation of the courts 
if they hold lawyers accountable for their roles in corporate client 
crime and fraud.296 
The problem is more complicated than courts mistakenly 
relying on agency principles in these cases or being too rigid in 
following in pari delicto precedent.  The decisions denying 
organizational clients a legal malpractice action reflect 
skepticism that lawyers are responsible for the damages suffered 
292 A related benefit would be discouraging corporate crime and fraud. But the 
focus of the malpractice action itself is preventing harm to the corporate client that 
the lawyer was hired to serve competently. 
293 In the securities fraud context of the Supreme Court’s Bateman decision, 
there are other possible avenues of enforcing securities fraud laws other than 
allowing those who participated in the misconduct to proceed as plaintiffs. 
Nonetheless, the Court determined that securities fraud policy was advanced by 
allowing plaintiffs who had traded on inside information to bring a securities fraud 
claim. Bateman, 472 U.S. at 315 (discussing the SEC’s limited resources in detecting 
and pursuing claims of such fraud and concluding that allowing co-conspirator 
security fraud claims promotes the policy underlying securities fraud law). In 
contrast, in this context, only a so-called co-conspirator organizational client could 
bring a cause of action for legal malpractice against an attorney who did not act 
competently to protect it from legal liability. In other words, the public policy of 
attorneys acting competently to protect organizational clients from liability is 
furthered only if this cause of action is allowed, providing even stronger grounds 
than in Bateman for allowing such cases to proceed. 
294 See supra notes 185–193 and accompanying text. Cf. Shepard, supra note 
100, at 337 (asserting that current application of the in pari delicto defense to 
auditors “as it relates to the very thing they were hired to help monitor eliminates a 
large incentive to do a good job”). 
295 See supra notes 152–168 and accompanying text. 
296 Some may conclude that courts’ refusal to hold lawyers accountable is 
evidence of the bias judges, as lawyers themselves, have in favor of lawyers. 
BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
2–3 (2013). 
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by clients in these cases.297  For example, in Kirschner, the New 
York Court of Appeals asserts that a company suing its outside 
professionals for malpractice is akin to an injured robber suing 
the police or the singed arsonist suing the fire department.298  
But these are not fair comparisons.299  Unlike the robber or the 
arsonist, the organizational client hired the lawyer for the 
purpose of competently representing its interests.300  Even if 
some of the organization’s agents believe it is in the company’s 
interests to push the limits of the law, the lawyer knows—and is 
required to assure the insiders understand—that it is in the 
company’s interest to avoid criminal and fraudulent conduct.301  
297 Cf. supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. The Kirschner court relies on the 
Cenco court’s statement that fraud on behalf of a corporation is different than fraud 
for it. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP 938 N.E.2d 941, 952–53 (N.Y. 2010) (citing Cenco 
Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982)). But an attorney is 
not allowed to view the world that way. An attorney is required to disregard the 
instructions of agents that want to commit fraud against it and for it. It is 
unsurprising that a court that takes this view would not impose liability on a lawyer 
who failed to protect an organizational client from liability stemming from fraud 
intended to enrich the client. Kirschner, 938 N.E.2d at 959. It is also predictable that 
lawyers share the view that they should not be liable for this failure. See, e.g., Kelli 
M. Hinson et al., Professional Liability, 66 SMU L. REV. 1055, 1059–60 (2013)
(describing a case in which a court refused to grant summary judgment in favor of
lawyers on the basis of in pari delicto as “a cautionary tale of how courts sometimes
step in and hold lawyers accountable when clients go bad”); Craig D. Singer, When
the Client Is a Fraud: Defending Professionals and Firms Following a Client’s
Misconduct, 42 LITIG. J. 35, 38 (2015) (“[A] corporation charged with primary
responsibility for fraud should not be permitted to recover against another party—
the professional defendant—for damages caused by the professional’s failure to stop
the corporation’s own fraud.”).
298 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
299 Another common description of the scenario is a client attempting to hold the 
lawyer accountable for failing to “ferret out” the client’s fraud. This presumes that 
the lawyer never plays an active role in the misconduct in these cases, which of 
course, is contradicted by the facts of these cases. See, e.g., supra note 28 and 
accompanying text (describing the active, criminal role Joseph Collins played in the 
Refco fraud that bankrupted the company). Further, even if the lawyer was only 
negligent in not detecting agents’ fraudulent scheme, such negligence still violates a 
duty the lawyer was arguably hired to perform. Determining the appropriateness of 
recovery are more appropriately determined by a fact finder considering issues of 
duty and causation than by a judge dismissing on the basis of in pari delicto. 
300 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 
(AM. LAW INST. 2000) (listing duties to clients); id. § 94 (stating that a lawyer can 
have liability to a client for advising the client to violate duties to third parties when 
doing so violates the duty of care to the client). 
301 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (stating 
that a lawyer must act in the best interests of the client which is defined as 
protecting it from agent conduct that will “violate[] a legal obligation to the 
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Unlike the company’s inside agents who are not experts in law, 
the company’s lawyer is obligated to advise about the risks of 
such liability, to advise against such conduct again and again 
through increasingly higher authorities if necessary and perhaps 
even outside of the company, and to refuse to participate in such 
behavior.302  When competent lawyers take these steps, 
companies can avoid substantial liability and their destruction. 
When a lawyer fails to act competently in this regard, either by 
negligence or through intentional participation in insider 
misconduct, the lawyer should be accountable to the company 
whose legal interests a competent lawyer would have 
protected.303 
Once courts recognize a lawyer’s legal obligation to an 
organizational client, they should be willing to align the 
application of the in pari delicto doctrine with attorney fiduciary 
duty.  Such an alignment would be accomplished with the 
following formulation: agent conduct will not be imputed to the 
organizational client for purposes of in pari delicto when an 
organizational client304 alleges that its lawyer failed to act 
competently305 to protect the organization against committing a 
organization” or that is “imputable to the organization and likely to result in 
substantial injury to it”); FDIC v. O’Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 
1992) (asserting that the presence of client fraud does not cancel the attorney’s duty 
of care); see also Schaefer, Loyal Disclosure, supra note 79, at 423 (explaining that 
attorneys are obligated to treat organizational clients as having an interest in 
avoiding legal liability). 
302 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. With no realistic threat of 
legal malpractice liability, there is little incentive for lawyers to wrestle with 
whether they are competently advising their corporate clients about the serious 
liability consequences of contemplated transactions. See Hill & Painter, supra note 
103, at 46 (describing situations in which lawyers advise and facilitate 
organizational client misconduct—and liability—because the lawyers focus on 
technical compliance with particular laws and loopholes). 
303 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48, 49 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (discussing a lawyer’s liability to the client for professional negligence or 
breach of fiduciary duty that is the legal cause of client injury); see also Harris, 
supra note 20, at 658 (“[I]f one sees the proper role of a transactional lawyer for an 
organization as including vigilance for the proper, legal conduct of the organization’s 
business within the scope of her engagement, it is natural that the lawyer should be 
liable when failure to reasonably fulfill that role results in harm to her client.”). 
304 This rule would also apply to a successor in interest to an organizational 
client. 
305 An allegation that an attorney did not act competently is generally described 
as a cause of action for professional negligence or malpractice. RESTATEMENT OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 48 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (discussing failure to exercise 
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crime or fraud,306 and that failure was the legal cause of the 
client’s injury, such as liability or bankruptcy.307  This 
formulation effectively aligns both bodies of law by not imputing 
agent conduct to organizational client under circumstances when 
the attorney would not be allowed to do so.308  Ultimately, this 
formulation allows plaintiffs the opportunity to present their case 
that a reasonably competent attorney would have protected the 
organizational client, irrespective of any explicit undertaking to 
do so. 
Professor Kevin Michels has suggested a “gatekeeper-
imputation exception” that would provide for no imputation of 
agent conduct to the corporate client in a legal malpractice case if 
(1) the lawyer agreed to undertake an investigation or
monitoring role; or (2) if there is an implied obligation to
investigate and monitor that can be “derived from certain ethics
rules, such as RPC 1.13 or . . . RPC 2.1, and statutory provisions
(such as the Sarbanes Oxley reporting requirements) which
require the attorney to undertake specific investigation or
reporting efforts in carefully delimited instances.”309  Professor
Michels asserts, “[I]t seems that something more than the duty of
care alone should be required to imply [an investigating and
monitoring] duty” and that “ethics rules that are roughly
analogous to the duty of care that attaches to all representations,
such as the duty of competence and communication requirements
of RPC 1.1 and RPC 1.4, respectively, should not, standing alone,
trigger the gatekeeper imputation exception.”310  In contrast, the
formulation suggested in this Article is based on the
understanding that a lawyer’s fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
care which is defined as the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers 
under the circumstances). The allegation could also or alternatively be that the 
attorney breached fiduciary duty or contractual obligations to the organizational 
client in failing to protect it from liability. Id. §§ 49, 55(1); see also supra note 6 
(explaining ways that the cause of action could be framed). 
306 Such failures could include failing to report misconduct up-the-ladder, failing 
to advise against illegal conduct, and even intentionally participating in such 
conduct. See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
307 Causation and damages are elements of a claim for professional negligence 
and breach of fiduciary duty. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 53 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
308 See supra notes 284–286 and accompanying text. 
309 Michels, supra note 92, at 363–64. 
310 Id. 
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impose an obligation to protect an organizational client from 
liability at the hands of agents.311  Professional conduct rules are 
not the original source of a duty to act competently and loyally to 
protect the organizational client from liability.  Rather, the 
professional conduct rules are reflective of fiduciary duties owed 
to an organizational client.312  The formulation suggested in the 
present Article would provide plaintiffs the opportunity to 
present, through expert testimony, evidence that a reasonably 
prudent, loyal lawyer would have taken steps to protect the 
organizational client under the circumstances presented in a 
given case, irrespective of a specific undertaking to do so and 
regardless of whether a specific professional conduct rule 
addresses the issue.313 
As a result of the change in the law of imputation suggested 
in this Article, the in pari delicto doctrine could not be invoked by 
lawyers to seek dismissal, judgment on the pleadings, or 
summary judgment on the basis that company agents were 
participants in misconduct.314  In most situations, these cases 
would proceed to trial and an attorney would defend by 
presenting evidence that the attorney did not breach duties to 
the organizational client or that any such breach did not cause 
damages to the client.315  Just as in any other malpractice case, 
the client—or successor—and lawyer would rely upon expert 
testimony regarding what a reasonably prudent lawyer should 
311 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. But see supra note 278 and 
accompanying text (acknowledging that little case law explains this obligation 
because the in pari delicto defense has barred pursuit of claims for breaching the 
duty). 
312 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text; see also Simon, supra note 80, 
at 503 (asserting that fiduciary duty owed to the organizational client is even 
broader than that described in Model Rule 1.13(b), but that the rule is sometimes 
mistakenly interpreted as stating the full extent of the lawyer’s obligation in the face 
of agent misconduct). 
313 See infra note 316 and accompanying text. 
314 As a matter of civil procedure, prior to trial, courts must accept the truth of 
the allegations of a complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 12(c), 56. Under the proposed 
change in the law, proof satisfactory to the finder of fact would be the only route to a 
defense victory based on imputation. See infra notes 327–329 and accompanying 
text, for scenarios in which such proof could be established. 
315 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 48, 49 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (describing elements of proof for claims of professional negligence and 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
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have done under the circumstances.316  Taking away in pari 
delicto does not guarantee a finding of malpractice under these 
facts, but simply provides the opportunity for the client or its 
successor to prove its case.317 
This doctrinal approach—of not presumptively imputing 
agent conduct to principal for purposes of in pari delicto in such 
cases—is preferable to other efforts to limit the breadth of the 
defense.  Expansion of the adverse-interest exception318 and 
creation of a bad faith exception319 do not get to the heart of the 
issue:  it is not appropriate or fair to impute agent conduct to the 
principal if it was the attorney’s obligation to protect the 
principal from that agent.320  While the innocent decision-maker 
exception could ultimately accomplish the same goal as refusing 
imputation,321 it is unnecessarily complicated in that the default 
rule would still be imputation,322 and would be subject to doubt 
because of its origin of arising out of a misunderstanding of the 
316 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52, cmt. g 
(alleging professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty ordinarily introduces 
expert testimony on the standard of care); see, e.g., FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 
1550–51 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting conflicting expert testimony on the issue of whether 
attorneys had breached duty of care to bank client in how attorneys handled client’s 
agent’s fraud and determining adequate evidence supported jury’s verdict against 
attorneys). This is an example of how the law of attorney fiduciary duty can address 
new problems in the representation of entity clients by referring to core values of 
competence and loyalty. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First 
Century, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (2011) (“Fiduciary law can accommodate new 
situations . . . yet maintain its core values and norms.”). 
317 Thus, it is not the all-or-nothing proposition posed by some commentators. 
See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 88, at 198–99 (asserting that shareholders may 
prefer the Cenco imputation rule, which would bar a professional negligence cause of 
action, because “putting professionals on the hook for negligently failing to 
uncover . . . ‘fraud’ ” would cause attorneys to refuse representations now that the 
boundaries of fraud have become murkier). But the issue is not whether lawyers 
should always or never have liability when they fail to protect against client fraud. 
The question is whether liability should be a possibility or should always be 
prohibited based on imputation. Allowing the possibility of liability seems a more 
sensible solution if we want lawyers to fulfill their fiduciary duties to organizational 
clients. 
318 See supra Section IV.A. 
319 See supra Section IV.B. 
320 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
321 See supra Section IV.C. 
322 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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law.323  In all of these cases, chipping away at imputation 
through exceptions is not as sensible as refusing imputation on a 
principled basis in the first instance. 
Further, allowing only so-called innocents, namely 
bankruptcy trustees or receivers,324 or the innocent ultimate 
claimants to any recovery,325 to pursue claims without the bar of 
in pari delicto disregards the fact that the organization itself is 
an innocent in this context.  The organizational client has an 
interest in avoiding liability at the hands of its agents and hires 
a lawyer to further this interest.326  If fiduciary duty law is to 
effectively impose this conception of organizational clients upon 
lawyers, it is essential that organizational clients be allowed to 
pursue these claims. 
The question remains whether there is a possible factual 
scenario in which agent knowledge or conduct should be imputed 
to the organizational client for purposes of in pari delicto.  For 
example, if the facts reveal that company’s lawyer took concerns 
of liability-creating conduct up-the-ladder to the highest 
authority in the company but those individuals still insisted upon 
engaging in the misconduct with counsel’s assistance,327 should 
the lawyer be allowed to invoke in pari delicto?  The answer 
should turn on whether the entity has innocent stakeholders.  As 
long as someone with a stake in the company has an interest in 
the company avoiding legal liability, then the company’s lawyer 
should not be allowed to escape liability through imputation of 
agent knowledge to the entity.328  In contrast, if the solvent 
323 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
324 See supra Section IV.D. 
325 See supra Section IV.E. 
326 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
327 In this scenario, the lawyer has arguably violated the standard of care by 
participating in client misconduct, but has informed the company’s highest authority 
of the potential for liability, thus providing the basis for an argument that the client 
had knowledge of and participated in the misconduct. Cf. supra notes 91–92 and 
accompanying text (arguing that it is unfair to impute agent conduct to principal 
when lawyer did not fulfill duty of up-the-ladder reporting). 
328 See supra note 88 and accompanying text (explaining the significance of 
innocent stakeholders); see also Harris, supra note 20, at 643 (summarizing duties of 
lawyer who becomes aware of agent crime or fraud for solvent and insolvent 
organizations); id. at 646 (asserting that agent conduct should not be imputed to 
organizational client to bar a cause of action against attorney in the case of a solvent 
organization unless either “wrongdoing representatives were 100 percent owners of 
the organization,” or the lawyer disclosed information about the wrongdoing to all 
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company is truly the “evil zombie” or alter ego of fully informed 
agent-owners, imputation for purposes of in pari delicto is 
arguably appropriate.329 
Abandoning imputation in most cases—and the resulting 
loss of the in pari delicto defense—does not mean that the 
lawyers must bear the full responsibility for organizational client 
misconduct.330  Organizations and their successors already have 
the ability to pursue claims against the insiders who played a 
role in the misconduct.331  Whether these insiders are sued in 
separate cases or as part of the same case, fact finders should be 
asked to assess the damages each agent caused to the company 
and hold the lawyer accountable only for his or her share.332 
CONCLUSION 
Sometime soon, another corporate scandal will break and the 
public will ask, “Where were the lawyers?”  The honest answer to 
that question should embarrass the legal profession.  Lawyers 
affected stakeholders who agreed further disclosure was unnecessary, while in the 
case of in insolvent organization, imputation would only be appropriate if the lawyer 
disclosed the misconduct “to affected parties outside of the organization”). 
329 Freeman v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 865 So. 2d 543, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003) (“In this case, NorthAmerican was controlled exclusively by persons 
engaging in its fraudulent scheme and benefitting from it. NorthAmerican was not a 
large corporation with an honest board of directors and multiple shareholders, 
suffering from the criminal acts of a few rogue employees in a regional office. It is 
clear from the allegations of the amended complaint that it was created by the 
Grazianos to dupe the customers. This corporation was entirely the robot or the evil 
zombie of the corporate insiders.”). 
330 This has been a frequent argument against abandoning in pari delicto. See, 
e.g., Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 957 (N.Y. 2010) (“This case reduces
down to whether, and under what circumstances, we choose to reinterpret New York
common law to permit corporations to shift responsibility for their own agents’
misconduct to third parties.”).
331 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
332 There is some appeal to framing the issue as one that can be resolved 
through the law of comparative fault applicable in the vast majority of U.S. 
jurisdictions. Johnson, Unlawful Conduct, supra note 104, at 78–79 (asserting that 
unlawful conduct defenses, including in pari delicto, are inconsistent with “the 
strongest trend in modern American tort law” of comparing fault rather than 
focusing solely on the plaintiff’s fault as in former contributory fault systems). 
However, there is dissonance in imputing the insiders’ conduct to the client for 
purposes of comparative fault but not for purposes of in pari delicto. Even without 
asking a jury to compare fault of the “organizational client” and lawyer, it seems 
workable for a jury to award to the client only the damages proximately caused by 
the lawyer’s breach and not by the breach of any other agent. 
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are fiduciaries who owe their clients duties of competence and 
loyalty.  If lawyers would uphold these duties, many business 
scandals could be prevented.  But there is no real incentive for 
lawyers to get it right.  The reason is the in pari delicto doctrine. 
The in pari delicto defense depends on a great irony.  The 
facts that should trigger liability for the lawyer—that the lawyer 
did not act reasonably to stop insider misconduct aimed at 
enriching the entity client—are the basis for the lawyer’s 
defense.  This is because the in pari delicto doctrine imputes 
agent conduct to the principal in the very circumstance when a 
competent, loyal lawyer is supposed to stop listening to company 
agents.  In short, the lawyer’s failure becomes his salvation.  The 
client cannot sue the lawyer because the lawyer did not do his 
job. 
The law of in pari delicto should be aligned with attorney 
fiduciary duty.  Doing so would mean that in most cases, agent 
misconduct would not be imputed to the organizational client. 
This change would result in the business client or its successor 
having a fair opportunity to pursue a claim against its lawyer for 
legal malpractice.  This would further the interests of business 
clients and the legal profession.  When attorneys know their 
fiduciary duty is not just theoretical but a possible basis of 
liability, they will have an incentive to protect their business 
clients from misguided agent conduct. 
